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Budget busters whos breaking the bank lesson 9 answer sheet


budget busters whos breaking the bank lesson 9 answer sheet

ANSWER KEY: BUDGET BUSTERS | 4 Budget Busters: Who's Breaking the Bank? LESSON 9: ANSWER KEY 1 Most successful budget: Jamal is the most successful budgeter. CHAPTER 1. The U.S. Health Disadvantage and Why It Matters to Business. 9 death rate among U.S. White males and females in every age group. In January 2021, following a shift to a 50-50 Democratic majority supported by Vice President Harris's tie-breaking vote, the legislative filibuster became a.

Budget busters whos breaking the bank lesson 9 answer sheet -

Bank It Lesson 10 Student Activity Sheet 2

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Standard 10: Institutions Standard 20: Fiscal Distribute a copy of the Family Activity Sheet to each student to share what they've .. 10 1 0 free downloadMirc 7 29 ita crackneuroanatomy crossman neary pdf 15. If you had $100 and wanted to put it into a savings account,  Copies of savings deposit and withdrawal slip worksheet (two per student).. Answer to Time Required: 20 minutes Bank It LESSON 10: STUDENT ACTIVITY SHEET 2 If you had $100 and wanted to put it into a saving.. LESSON: STUDENT ACTIVITY SHEET 1 Review the numbers to determine who's breaking the bank and who will meet.. ly/2ErGHKi 4ba26513c0 Based on your research, which bank or credit union would you .. ly/36xTmYJBased on your research, which bank or credit union would you choose? Bank or.. f5574a87f2Password Unlock for Diablo III SKIDROW OFFLINE CRACK rarpioneer-x-smc3-s-firmware-updatettgps center v3.. Have students create a classroom bank to simulate all the activities and services a bank offers.. Certificates of Deposit (CDs) 60 months, 2 20% APY 10 years, 15% APY Bank It Lesson 10 Student Activity Sheet 2 - http://bit.. ENtrEprEnEurS banks offer 2 Learn how kids can use a bank 3 Discover how a bank makes money.. Vocabulary In this lesson, students will take a quiz to identify whether they have saver or.. 2 Distribute a copy of the Spender/Saver quiz to each student 3 Give the Lesson 10 Activity 1 Student Worksheet: Spender/Saver quiz answer sheet .. LESSON 9: STUDENT ACTIVITY SHEET 1 Scenario 3 Jamal is a senior in Scenario 2.. Standard 10: Institutions Common Core 2 Invite volunteers to share their responses, and discuss the benefits of keeping money.. 0 crack rarfurious gold pack 9 free downloadCrouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon 720p torrentAndaz Apna Apna dual audio eng hindi 720p download in kickass torrentthis page uses fonts that need to be temporarily installedNero 7.. [Time Required: 10 minutes] 1 2 Ask the class why an emergency fund is important.. LESSON LEVEL Grades 6-8 KEy topicS Banking Credit & Debt Saving & Investing.. bank it lesson 10 student activity sheet 2 answer key, bank it lesson 10 student activity sheet 2 answers, bank it lesson 12 student activity sheet 2 answer key, bank it lesson 9 student activity sheet 1 answers, bank it lesson 9 student activity sheet 2 answers, bank it lesson 12 student activity sheet 1 answer key, bank it lesson 10 student activity sheet 2Bank It Lesson 10 Student Activity Sheet 2 ->->->-> http://bit.. What do we gain by being prepared for the Next, hand out the student activity sheet and ask students to work in groups of 4–5 to complete the.. 6 Banks – 2 students per bank – Handout 2 for each bank; Three pages of handout 2.. ǖTime Required: 10 minutesǗ LESSON 1: STUDENT ACTIVITY SHEET 2 Explain that buyers often take out loans from a bank to cover the.. This lesson introduces students to the concepts of saving for an emergency and other.. how much can you afford (the 20-10 rule) student activities 7 1 7-2 7-3 student activity 7-1 slide 7-A why banks issue credit.. Background Builder The activity will later illustrate that savings account work much the same way.. APPLICATION ACTIVITY 2

Keegan Evans

Keegan Evans, 25, is a co-owner of Wake Up Waffles; an online company that produces and sells high protein, gluten free waffle/pancake/baking mixes. Blending his passions for photography and fitness, Keegan embarked on the waffle journey with his fiancée/business partner Nicole in December 2016. They plan to expand their product lines and enter the retail market very soon. Keegan also co-owns Parker Lane Productions with his brother Colin where they produce Instagram content for a number of food companies.

 

Nicole Bergmann

Nicole Bergmann, 23, is a co-owner of Wake Up Waffles; an online company that produces high protein, gluten free pancake/waffle/baking mixes. Starting early on with a health and fitness-focused lifestyle she found the entrepreneurial bug and created the company with her fiancé Keegan Evans in December of 2016. With a successful 2 years and the ongoing ambition to build the company to its fullest, Nicole and Keegan plan on expanding in the near future.

 

Dylan Gilligan

I started my first business when I was 17 years old in my basement called Merch Buttons. I worked at Sears installing appliances in the day, played in a traveling band at night, then worked on Merch Buttons sales from 12am – 4am most nights. I made bulk order custom 1″ pin back buttons for Bands and Companies. After a while of being in business and hiring employees I decided to start offering Tshirts and Stickers to my customers. I outsourced to a company in Atlanta, GA for Tshirts. After a while I began to outsell the sales team in GA. They offered to buy Merch Buttons and move me to Atlanta to become head of sales at Terminus Tees. My first year there I doubled their yearly sales. After trying out Atlanta for a year and a half I decided the south was not for me and I would move back to upstate NY and start Upstate Merch in the fall of 2009. Since then Upstate Merch has had rapid growth each year. We are currently one of the larger apparel printing shops in New York. I am also a father of 2 kids, Rotarian, and an active community member.

 

Kevin Webb

He discovered his passion for health and fitness while playing various sports, mostly at Susquehanna-Valley High School. He graduated from SUNY Broome with a degree in Business, then attended the American Academy of Personal Training in Boston. He started his Personal Training business in the fall of 2012, and opened his first location of KW Fitness in Vestal in March of 2014. In October 2017, KW Fitness opened it’s 2nd location in Fayetteville, NY. KW Fitness prides itself on being the Premier Lifestyle Coaching Center for men and women who are frustrated with how far they have let themselves go. Unlike other gyms that pack classes and are lacking in support and accountability with programs that fail to deliver, KW Fitness ends the frustration by helping each client improve their quality of life through safe, effective personal training and nutrition programs that are customized to each individual, with guaranteed results.

 

Mandy Webb

Mandy Webb was born and raised in Syracuse, NY. When she was 19 years old, she began her first entrepreneurial venture by selling Cutco Cutlery: a high quality line of kitchen products. She was responsible for finding her own clientele, worked 100% on commission, and had to grow her business through referrals. She became one of the top all time sales reps for the company and, after 5 years, she moved to Binghamton to open her own district office and grow a team of sales representatives. Her team broke every territory record for the company and she taught hundreds of high school seniors & college students sales skills, public speaking skills, time management, mindset management, and goal setting. She closed her office in 2014 when KW Fitness #1 was opened and spent some time selling HR Software and Advertising for WBNG. Mandy jumped on board with KW Fitness full time in 2017 when they decided to open location #2!

 

Erin Cody

Erin Elizabeth Cody is the Associate Director, Enhancing Student Experience at Binghamton University’s Fleishman Center for Career and Professional Development where she leads the Enhancing Student Experience Team of the Fleishman Center staff to solidify and enhance holistic graduate and undergraduate student experiential education programming and curriculum such as the Passport to Career Success, Explore Program for First Year students, Career Development Centralized Internship Program, JFEW/Binghamton Leadership & Career Development Scholars Program, Student Employment Initiative, and partnering across campus to foster a “culture of career preparedness.” Erin is honored to supervise a team of dynamic internship and career consulting professionals, who deliver the Nationally Recognized Exemplary level of service as well as over 700 programs and events that were attended by over 10,700 Binghamton students last year that the National Career Development Association has honored the Fleishman team for as leaders in higher education in late 2017. Erin has helped Binghamton students and alumni reach their career goals since July 2006. She is a Nationally Certified Counselor who completed her MS in Community Counseling and Certificate of Advanced Graduate Study in Professional Counseling at The University of Scranton and her Bachelor of Music in Music Education at Moravian College. Prior to working at Binghamton, Erin worked in Career Centers at Lafayette College, Penn State Altoona and The University of Scranton. Erin is honored to be a part of the Greater Binghamton community as a resident of Vestal, NY who engages in community service and is happy to join the YP Summit as a moderator today.

Источник: https://greaterbinghamtonchamber.com/what-the-governors-budget-means-for-business/
We've received SOP on Omicron along with the list of at-risk countries. We will put those restrictions at Bagdogra airport in coordination with the AAI. We are intensifying our mask enforcement activities and covid tests: S Ponnambalam, DM, Darjeeling

Omicron Scare: India curtails tour of South Africa, T20Is to be played later

The Indian cricket team's tour of South Africa will go ahead but the team's departure has been postponed by a week and T20 Internationals are no longer a part of the schedule, the two boards announced on Saturday, ending the speculation surrounding the series after a new COVID-19 variant triggered anxiety. The four T20s will be played at a later date and Cricket South Africa said it will confirm the venues for the new schedule in the next 48 hours.

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Prime Minister Narendra Modi has asked people to remain calm and do not panic. He also advised people to take small yet important measures to ensure self-protection from the coronavirus.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Tuesday said that he held an extensive review on the preparedness for novel coronavirus.

Government launches helpline numbers, Coronavirus India helpline number: +91-11-23978046 Coronavirus India helpline email: [email protected]

Travel advisory on COVID-19 said, "All regular (sticker) Visas/e-Visa (including VoA for Japan&S Korea) granted to nationals of Italy, Iran, South Korea, Japan& issued on or before 3 March and who have not yet entered India, stand suspended with immediate effect."

In view of the emerging global scenarios regarding COVID19 disease, in supersession of all earlier advisories, the government issued the new travel advisory.

Reserve Bank of India has stated that globally, financial markets have been experiencing considerable volatility, with the spread of the coronavirus triggering risk-off sentiments.

Hotels and tourists sites in Agra have been instructed to inform the office of the Chief Medical Officer as soon as visitors from Italy, Iran or China arrive, so that they can be screened for coronavirus infection.

India restricted exports of 26 pharma formulations and drugs in the wake of Coronavirus.

Union Health Ministry held a meeting with the Rajasthan Health Department officials over coronavirus outbreak. RK Singh, ACS Health says, "All the hotels where the Italian tourist stayed are being sanitized. People who came in contact with the infected person, their samples taken".

Meanwhile, Telangana government has issued advisory for people amid the outbreak of a positive case of the COVID-19 in the state.

Telangana government has also launched a 24/7 helpline service to assist the people who are experiencing symptoms related to the virus.

Anurag Bhargav, Chief Medical Officer of Gautam Buddh Nagar said regarding the Noida school that has been closed, "Several schoolmates of children of a COVID-19 infected man came into contact with him at a party. We have closed down the school to sanitize it. The infected man is admitted to a hospital in Delhi."

The Bengaluru techie working in Hyderabad has been quarantined and is being treated at Gandhi Hospital in Hyderabad, following strict screening protocols.

The Civil Aviation Ministry conducts a review meeting with all airports to guide the preparations to prevent the spread of the infection in the country.

40 students of Noida school sent to isolation for 28 days after parent tests positive for Coronavirus.

Iran reports 11 new coronavirus deaths, death toll reaches 77.

The Hyatt Regency Delhi on Tuesday asked its employees to self-quarantine for 14 days after it came to light that a COVID-19 patient had dined at a restaurant in the hotel on February 28. Health Ministry officials were seen sanitising the hotel, the report said. The hotel management issued a statement saying that it is taking precautionary measures.

Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) restricts export of 26 Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (API) in its revised export policy.

Telangana Health Minister E Rajendra said,''Till now not a single person has been affected by #COVID19 in the state, except the youth who arrived from Dubai. 88 people have been identified who came in contact with him,45 of them are being tested, others will also be tested.''

In the wake of the coronavirus outbreak, the 14th edition of Art Dubai, which was scheduled to be held on March 25-28, has been "postponed" till further notice, organisers announced on Tuesday. In a statement signed by Benedict Floyd, Pablo del Val, and Chloe Vaitsou, the CEO, artistic director, and international director of the fair respectively, a new Dubai-focused programme has been announced in place of the international fair.

Delhi Deputy Chief Minister Manish Sisodia: Chief Minister was informed about the one positive case. In 25 hospitals, the process of setting up of isolation wards is underway. We have to take care of personal hygiene & develop a habit of washing our hands frequently.

IndiGo statement: The Coronavirus affected passenger in Hyderabad travelled on IndiGo flight 6E 96 (Dubai-Bangalore) on Feb 20. All 4 cabin crew who operated this flight have been placed on home observation. We're following all prescribed Airport Health Organization guidelines.

Navy’s Milan multilateral naval exercise planned to be held from March 18 in Visakhapatnam may be cancelled in view of Coronavirus. Govt has asked Army, Navy and Air Force to be prepared for quarantine facilities for over 2500 suspected cases in coming days.

CISF provides sanitisers, gloves and masks to its airport-guarding troops

Wuhan closes makeshift hospital as new coronavirus cases in China drop sharply

New dates are being worked out for the Milan exercise in which around 40 countries were supposed to participate.

24 people including 3 Indians and 21 Italian nationals residing in a hotel of South Delhi have been shifted to Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) camp for testing of Coronavirus. Their test results will come tomorrow.

Uttar Pradesh: Six suspected cases of COVID19 found in the state. All suspected patients have been admitted to Safdarjung Hospital in Delhi. Samples have been sent to National Institute of Virology, Pune for testing.

Haryana Police has issued an advisory instructing its field units to take immediate action to safeguard on-duty police personnel from potential Coronavirus infection by equipping them with masks, gloves and hand sanitizers etc.

Pope Francis, who is suffering from a cold, has tested negative for the coronavirus, an Italian newspaper reported Tuesday, as Italy battles Europe's worst outbreak. Vatican spokesman Matteo Bruni did not respond to a request for comment on the report in the Messaggero newspaper.

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    Источник: https://www.oneindia.com/india/coronavirus-live-indias-covid-vaccination-crosses-100-crore-mark-3043504.html A passenger from Singapore who had tested positive for COVID-19 at the Madurai Airport yesterday, has been admitted to Aasaripallam Government Hospital. It is yet to be ascertained if he has been infected with the Omicron variant: Kanniyakumari District admin

    Himachal Pradesh An Air Arabia flight carrying 95 passengers landed at Nagpur today. All these passengers underwent RT-PCR tests at the airport, their test results will be out soon. All passengers need to follow the home quarantine rule: Dy Commissioner, Nagpur Municipal Corporation

    While a merchant navy engineer in Dombivli, near Mumbai, is confirmed to have been infected by the omicro variant of Covid-19, the reports of several others who have undergone tests are awaited, according to a Times of India report on Sunday, December 5.

    The US has made it mandatory for all incoming passengers, including those from India, to carry a negative COVID-19 test report or a proof of recovery from the contagion amidst rising number of cases of the new Omicron variant.

    Over 50 per cent of India's eligible adult population is now fully vaccinated against Covid-19, Union Health Minister Mansukh Mandaviya said on Sunday as the cumulative vaccine doses administered in the country exceeded 127.61 crore.

    India reports 8,895 new cases, 2796 deaths in the last 24 hours, active caseload at 99,155. The country reported a single-day rise of 2,796 deaths on Sunday after Bihar reconciled its Covid data. This pushed the overall death toll to 473,326, the report added.

    The government of Puducherry makes COVID19 vaccination compulsory in the Union Territory with immediate effect.

    INSACOG, a national consortium of government institutions involved in genome sequencing of the novel coronavirus, has denied “recommending or suggesting” booster doses for those aged 40 and above.

    Britain will require all inbound travellers to take a pre-departure COVID-19 test, and arrivals from Nigeria will have to quarantine in hotels to slow the spread of the Omicron variant, health minister Sajid Javid said on Saturday.

    The WHO said on Friday that it had not received any reports of Omicron-related deaths, but the new variant’s spread has prompted warnings that it could cause more than half of Europe’s Covid cases in the coming months. The WHO has warned that determining how infectious the variant is, whether it causes more severe illness, and how effective treatments and vaccines are against it could take weeks.

    Dutch former queen Beatrix, 83, has tested positive for COVID-19, the royal information service RVD said in a statement Saturday. Princess Beatrix, as she has been known since her abdication in 2013, got tested after coming down with “mild cold symptoms”, the statement said.

    Higher hospital admissions among children during a fourth wave of COVID-19 infections in South Africa that has been driven by the Omicron coronavirus variant should not prompt panic as infections have been mild, a health official said on Saturday.

    The mayor of Rio de Janeiro canceled New Year’s Eve celebrations after Brazil confirmed the first known cases of the Omicron coronavirus variant in Latin America’s biggest country. Eduardo Paes tweeted on Saturday that he would follow the recommendations of Rio de Janeiro state to cancel the celebrations, despite the city’s own view to the contrary.

    Fifteen suspected patients of Omicron, who flew in the national capital from “at risk” countries”, are admitted to the Delhi government’s LNJP hospital, according to a senior hospital official. Of these, nine are confirmed coronavirus patients, while six have symptoms like sore throat, fever and history of contact with patients. Their samples have been sent for genome sequencing and the results will take four or five days, the official said.

    TN inoculates 20.98 lakh in 13th mega vaccination drive

    Tamil Nadu inoculated 20,98,712 people against COVID-19 in the 13th mega vaccination exercise conducted across the State on Saturday, the Health Department said. A total of 7,50,147 people received the first dose while 13,48,565 received the second dose -- 80.44 per cent for the first dose, and 47.46 per cent second dose, a press release said.

    India achieves the grand feat of administering 1 crore vaccine doses in a single day.

    Two Ayurveda medical students tested COVID positive in Hubli Two students tested positive. They've travelled to Ayodhya, Delhi & other places. We've suspended all 4 batches of BAMS classes till further notice: Dr Prahsant A S, Principal, Ayurveda Mahavidyalaya

    It's a matter of concern, we're reviewing the situation. We're continuing vaccination but we also switched to booster in the country. Protective measures still in force. We're very vigilant about the situation: French Ambassador Emmanuel Lenain on #Omicron situation in his country

    Kerala reports 4557 new Covid-19 cases, 5,108 recoveries and 52 deaths in the last 24 hours. 263 deaths were added to covid death list as per new guidelines of central government - state govt issues COVID data. Death toll 41,439 Active cases 43,771

    Uttar Pradesh reports 27 new #COVID19 cases, 8 recoveries and zero deaths in the last 24 hours. Total recoveries 16,87,424 Death toll 22,911 Active cases 116

    Punjab reports 46 new #COVID19 cases, 52 recoveries and one death in the last 24 hours. Total cases 6,03,451 Total recoveries 5,86,496 Death toll 16,608 Active cases 347

    Delhi reports 51 new #COVID19 cases, 61 recoveries and zero deaths in the last 24 hours. Total cases 14,41,295 Total recoveries 14,15,875 Death toll 25,098 Active cases 322

    West Bengal

    San Francisco Chronicle

    Jessica Didia (left) sits in her mom Laurie Steves’s car as she smokes a mixture of crack and fentanyl together on Wednesday, June 9, 2021 in San Francisco, California. This was the second time they had seen one another in nearly 10 years. Laurie’s son Zachary died last December of a drug overdose and her daughter Jessica has been homeless and addicted to drugs in San Francisco for a decade. The death of her son propelled her to try and save her daughter. Laurie packed up her apartment in Port Orchard, Washington and moved to San Francisco with the idea that she would stay there for “as long as it takes” to help Jessica.
    Chronicle In-Depth
    Chronicle In-Depth
    She moved to S.F. to save her daughter from fentanyl. She had no idea what she'd be up against

    Laurie Steves already lost one child to a drug overdose. Can she save another? She quit her job, gave up her apartment and packed her wardrobe in boxes. To save her daughter’s life, Laurie gave up her own.

    Источник: https://www.sfchronicle.com/

    Budget busters whos breaking the bank lesson 9 answer sheet -

    We've received SOP on Omicron along with the list of at-risk countries. We will put those restrictions at Bagdogra airport in coordination with the AAI. We are intensifying our mask enforcement activities and covid tests: S Ponnambalam, DM, Darjeeling

    Omicron Scare: India curtails tour of South Africa, T20Is to be played later

    The Indian cricket team's tour of South Africa will go ahead but the team's departure has been postponed by a week and T20 Internationals are no longer a part of the schedule, the two boards announced on Saturday, ending the speculation surrounding the series after a new COVID-19 variant triggered anxiety. The four T20s will be played at a later date and Cricket South Africa said it will confirm the venues for the new schedule in the next 48 hours.

    READ MORE

    Prime Minister Narendra Modi has asked people to remain calm and do not panic. He also advised people to take small yet important measures to ensure self-protection from the coronavirus.

    Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Tuesday said that he held an extensive review on the preparedness for novel coronavirus.

    Government launches helpline numbers, Coronavirus India helpline number: +91-11-23978046 Coronavirus India helpline email: [email protected]

    Travel advisory on COVID-19 said, "All regular (sticker) Visas/e-Visa (including VoA for Japan&S Korea) granted to nationals of Italy, Iran, South Korea, Japan& issued on or before 3 March and who have not yet entered India, stand suspended with immediate effect."

    In view of the emerging global scenarios regarding COVID19 disease, in supersession of all earlier advisories, the government issued the new travel advisory.

    Reserve Bank of India has stated that globally, financial markets have been experiencing considerable volatility, with the spread of the coronavirus triggering risk-off sentiments.

    Hotels and tourists sites in Agra have been instructed to inform the office of the Chief Medical Officer as soon as visitors from Italy, Iran or China arrive, so that they can be screened for coronavirus infection.

    India restricted exports of 26 pharma formulations and drugs in the wake of Coronavirus.

    Union Health Ministry held a meeting with the Rajasthan Health Department officials over coronavirus outbreak. RK Singh, ACS Health says, "All the hotels where the Italian tourist stayed are being sanitized. People who came in contact with the infected person, their samples taken".

    Meanwhile, Telangana government has issued advisory for people amid the outbreak of a positive case of the COVID-19 in the state.

    Telangana government has also launched a 24/7 helpline service to assist the people who are experiencing symptoms related to the virus.

    Anurag Bhargav, Chief Medical Officer of Gautam Buddh Nagar said regarding the Noida school that has been closed, "Several schoolmates of children of a COVID-19 infected man came into contact with him at a party. We have closed down the school to sanitize it. The infected man is admitted to a hospital in Delhi."

    The Bengaluru techie working in Hyderabad has been quarantined and is being treated at Gandhi Hospital in Hyderabad, following strict screening protocols.

    The Civil Aviation Ministry conducts a review meeting with all airports to guide the preparations to prevent the spread of the infection in the country.

    40 students of Noida school sent to isolation for 28 days after parent tests positive for Coronavirus.

    Iran reports 11 new coronavirus deaths, death toll reaches 77.

    The Hyatt Regency Delhi on Tuesday asked its employees to self-quarantine for 14 days after it came to light that a COVID-19 patient had dined at a restaurant in the hotel on February 28. Health Ministry officials were seen sanitising the hotel, the report said. The hotel management issued a statement saying that it is taking precautionary measures.

    Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) restricts export of 26 Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (API) in its revised export policy.

    Telangana Health Minister E Rajendra said,''Till now not a single person has been affected by #COVID19 in the state, except the youth who arrived from Dubai. 88 people have been identified who came in contact with him,45 of them are being tested, others will also be tested.''

    In the wake of the coronavirus outbreak, the 14th edition of Art Dubai, which was scheduled to be held on March 25-28, has been "postponed" till further notice, organisers announced on Tuesday. In a statement signed by Benedict Floyd, Pablo del Val, and Chloe Vaitsou, the CEO, artistic director, and international director of the fair respectively, a new Dubai-focused programme has been announced in place of the international fair.

    Delhi Deputy Chief Minister Manish Sisodia: Chief Minister was informed about the one positive case. In 25 hospitals, the process of setting up of isolation wards is underway. We have to take care of personal hygiene & develop a habit of washing our hands frequently.

    IndiGo statement: The Coronavirus affected passenger in Hyderabad travelled on IndiGo flight 6E 96 (Dubai-Bangalore) on Feb 20. All 4 cabin crew who operated this flight have been placed on home observation. We're following all prescribed Airport Health Organization guidelines.

    Navy’s Milan multilateral naval exercise planned to be held from March 18 in Visakhapatnam may be cancelled in view of Coronavirus. Govt has asked Army, Navy and Air Force to be prepared for quarantine facilities for over 2500 suspected cases in coming days.

    CISF provides sanitisers, gloves and masks to its airport-guarding troops

    Wuhan closes makeshift hospital as new coronavirus cases in China drop sharply

    New dates are being worked out for the Milan exercise in which around 40 countries were supposed to participate.

    24 people including 3 Indians and 21 Italian nationals residing in a hotel of South Delhi have been shifted to Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) camp for testing of Coronavirus. Their test results will come tomorrow.

    Uttar Pradesh: Six suspected cases of COVID19 found in the state. All suspected patients have been admitted to Safdarjung Hospital in Delhi. Samples have been sent to National Institute of Virology, Pune for testing.

    Haryana Police has issued an advisory instructing its field units to take immediate action to safeguard on-duty police personnel from potential Coronavirus infection by equipping them with masks, gloves and hand sanitizers etc.

    Pope Francis, who is suffering from a cold, has tested negative for the coronavirus, an Italian newspaper reported Tuesday, as Italy battles Europe's worst outbreak. Vatican spokesman Matteo Bruni did not respond to a request for comment on the report in the Messaggero newspaper.

    READ MORE

    For Breaking News and Instant Updates

    Allow Notifications

    You have already subscribed

    Read more about:

    coronavirusindiapandemic

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    Источник: https://www.oneindia.com/india/coronavirus-live-indias-covid-vaccination-crosses-100-crore-mark-3043504.html We are raising awareness among people. Random testing is going to start at railway stations, airports and border areas: Uttarakhand CM Pushkar Singh Dhami on precautionary measures taken by Govt over Omicron variant

    Haridwar A passenger from Singapore who had tested positive for COVID-19 at the Madurai Airport yesterday, has been admitted to Aasaripallam Government Hospital. It is yet to be ascertained if he has been infected with the Omicron variant: Kanniyakumari District admin

    Himachal Pradesh

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    Unequal Power


    Part of the Unequal Power project, an EPI initiative to reestablish the understanding in law, politics, economics, and philosophy, that equal bargaining power between workers and employers does not exist. Recognizing this inherent workplace inequality will bolster freedom, economic fairness, workplace protections and democracy.

    Executive Summary

    An increasing volume of research demonstrates that erosion of worker bargaining power and collective bargaining have led to wage suppression and the deterioration of labor’s share of income. At the same time, bold and robust policy proposals to strengthen workers’ bargaining power have risen to a new level of priority for the center-left. President-elect Joe Biden has produced an extensive proposal to strengthen workers’ ability to form unions, and a comprehensive reform of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) recently passed the U.S. House of Representatives.

    A full appreciation of the need for comprehensive labor law reform requires an understanding of the serious shortcomings in current law and how they have been exploited over the years by employers resisting efforts by their workers to form unions. Structural weaknesses in the law, exacerbated by anti-union amendments to the NLRA in 1947 and aided by a series of rulings by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and courts, have allowed employers to interfere in and defeat efforts by their workers to organize unions and to face no real consequences for doing so. The full effect of these trends can be seen by analyzing how dramatically new unionization fell in the 1970s—a trajectory from which the labor movement has never recovered.

    This paper explains what happened to private-sector unionization in the 1970s by examining data on union elections and workers’ ability to achieve an initial collective bargaining agreement. After showing that a dramatically smaller percentage of workers have been successful at forming a union and winning a first contract, the paper examines the changes in employer anti-union behavior that contributed to this result.

    Among its key findings, the paper shows that in the 1950s and 1960s more than 1% of those employed participated in an NLRA election each year. In the 1970s that share fell to 0.78% and in the 1980s to 0.29%. In addition, workers began to lose elections at a higher rate in the 1970s in the face of increased employer resistance. In the 1940s, workers won a union in 80 percent of NLRB representation elections, but by 1977 workers were losing more than half of these elections. And, while 86% of workers who chose a union were able to win a first contract in the 1950s, that share declined to less than 70% in the 1970s. By the 1990s, it was down to 56%. Putting these three pieces together—participation in elections, successful elections, and winning a first contract—we show that while 0.46% of the workforce was able to make it across the unionizing finish line in the 1966–1968 period, only 0.17% of the workforce was able to do so by 1978–1980.

    In addition, by the 1970s employers were charged with committing significantly more unfair labor practices (ULPs), such as firing union activists during organizing campaigns. ULP charges against employers rose sevenfold between 1950 and 1980. Starting in the 1970s, employers also made greater use of the “free speech” rights included in the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947, holding mandatory “captive audience” meetings to voice opposition to unions and make thinly veiled threats about what could happen if workers organized. Employers also began far more extensive use of a growing “union avoidance” industry of consultants. While there were just a handful of anti-union consulting firms in the beginning of the 1970s, by decade’s end there were hundreds, and a management consultant told Congress in the late 1970s that his industry had grown tenfold over the preceding decade.

    Employers were able to defeat unions so effectively because, over the years, labor law had become heavily tilted against workers and toward employers. Though these employer-friendly laws were on the books in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, it was not until the 1970s that employers began to take full advantage of their power. Several key sources set the stage for this 1970s unraveling of workers’ bargaining power under the law. First, a Republican Congress largely neutered workers’ leverage in passing the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act over President Truman’s veto. Second, Taft-Hartley forced the NLRB to prioritize litigation against unions for engaging in so-called secondary activity over all other cases, including cases involving illegal firings of union supporters. Third, the law’s ineffective remedies became obvious, and the NLRB’s efforts to hold employers accountable for violating the law were stymied in the courts. Fourth, employers increasingly found an ally in the U.S. Supreme Court, which issued a series of decisions restricting workers’ rights and limiting employers’ bargaining obligations. Finally, employers started making greater use of replacement workers during strikes—a trend that grew in the 1970s and 1980s and significantly undermined workers’ right to strike. The cumulative impact of these factors meant that by the 1970s the law did not effectively protect workers’ bargaining power and gave employers a wealth of tools to resist unionization.

    Legislative efforts to strengthen the law in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1990s were thwarted by an organized and united business community that stepped up to vigorously oppose and, through a filibuster by a minority of senators, defeat all attempts at legislative reform.

    By telling the story through statistics, labor history, and the law about the various factors that resulted in the decline of unionization, this paper provides a more accurate accounting of the decline of unionization than do the frequent assertions of globalization or automation as the driving forces. Our empirical assessment of the role of globalization and automation focuses on the impact of the shrinkage on manufacturing employment. We provide detailed statistical analyses showing that at most one-fifth of the decline is due to manufacturing’s erosion, and provide evidence of the severe declines in union coverage in nonmanufacturing sectors (e.g., utilities, transportation, construction, mining, and communications) and in many nonmanufacturing industries (e.g., grocery stores, bus transportation, newspapers, metal ore mining, and building services). A review of various analyses of wage determination also casts doubt on a dominant role of automation and globalization on private-sector union decline. Last, an examination of international comparisons of union erosion also confirms a minor role for manufacturing decline, finding that the pace, intensity, and timing of union decline does not correspond to manufacturing’s decline.

    Survey research confirms that working people want unions: Recent polling shows that nearly half of nonunion workers would vote to have union representation if given an opportunity to do so on their current job.

    Labor law has not kept pace with workers’ interests and needs and provides a classic example of “policy drift,” the failure to update the law to reflect changing external circumstances, with the result that and the outcomes of the policy start to shift. Labor law’s support for workers’ ability to pursue union organizing and collective bargaining has declined over many decades, and efforts to remedy this drift have been blocked by a minority of senators despite majority support in both houses of Congress and presidential support for reform.

    As policymakers and others concerned about the erosion of workers’ bargaining power and its impacts on today’s workforce debate measures to strengthen the ability of workers to organize, the background information and analysis in this paper should be of assistance in understanding the shortcomings in current law that need to be addressed if workers are to truly have the freedom to form and join unions.

    Introduction

    After decades of growing economic inequality, bold and robust policy agendas on labor and union policy have arisen on the center-left of American politics. The candidates in the 2020 Democratic presidential primaries, including the eventual nominee, offered expansive policies (Greenhouse 2019; Biden 2020), and an extensive reform of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) recently passed the U.S. House of Representatives (McNicholas 2020). On the research front, there is an increased appreciation of the prominent role that the erosion of union/worker power has played in generating wage suppression and inequality (Stansbury and Summers 2020; Fortin et al. 2019).

    This paper provides background for the consideration of changes in labor law by addressing the question: Why have union membership and union coverage (membership plus those covered by collective bargaining, even if not members) declined so precipitously in the private sector? We argue that corporations took advantage of the weak labor law regime in the United States to legally and illegally thwart union organizing and robust bargaining, especially in the 1970s, thus closing off unions’ ability to bring in new members and grow along with the economy.

    Also key to unions’ decline were corporate practices and legal changes in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s that eroded bargaining power. We use a broad historical context to show how this assault on organizing and bargaining power weaponized weaknesses in the NLRA as interpreted by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the courts. Examples include the weak penalties established from near the very start for employer violations; a 1938 Supreme Court ruling on striker replacements; and the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947 recognizing “employer free speech,” allowing right-to-work laws, and banning secondary boycotts.

     


    Unequal Power events • Oct. 7, 2020

    Rebuilding Collective Bargaining Back Better

    Watch video • Download slides


     

    As such, the decline of private-sector unionism provides a classic example of what political scientists call “policy drift”:

    Drift occurs when a policy or institution is not updated to reflect changing external circumstances, and this lack of updating causes the outcomes of the policy or institution to shift—sometimes dramatically. (Galvin and Hacker 2020)

    In the case of labor law, its support for workers’ ability to pursue union organizing and collective bargaining has declined over many decades, and the weaknesses began to be exploited by management extensively in the 1970s.i

    Except for an expansion of coverage into health care in the 1970s, all of the legislative changes to the NLRA since its enactment in the mid-1930s have been changes that weakened unions. Efforts during the Great Society period, when Democrats were at their peak congressional power, and under each successive Democratic president—Carter in 1978, Clinton in 1993, and Obama in 2009—to strengthen the NLRA’s protections of workers’ rights to collective bargaining were all defeated, despite majority support in both the House and Senate and by the president. The tool employed in each defeat was the filibuster, spearheaded by a minority of senators representing an even smaller share of the population. The result has been policy drift in labor law, allowing outcomes to shift in favor of corporate employers and their allies.

    We find these explanations for union decline more persuasive than the dominant narrative that unions were dinosaurs that did not fit a modern economy characterized by automation and globalization. Indeed, we find only a limited role for automation and globalization on private-sector union decline. We quantify specifically the impact of the decline in manufacturing employment on union membership and coverage and find that less than a fifth of the union decline can be attributed to the loss of manufacturing employment’s importance. The experience of other advanced nations confirms the limited role of manufacturing’s erosion on union decline.

    Another common explanation for the decline in unionization is the contention that private-sector unions outlived their roles as workers decided they no longer needed unions, or that unions became complacent and stopped reaching out to organize new workers (Cowie 2010; Moody 1988; Davis 1986; McAlevey 2017). Though we do not substantively engage in this question in this limited forum, we find persuasive scholarship that highlights how union organizing activity and labor activism continued strongly through the key decade of the 1970s, even as success rates dropped. Moreover, the years between 1973 and 1977 represent the peak in absolute numbers of NLRB elections held (see the appendix), and women and people of color were at the forefront of much of this labor activism. Unions began to pull back dramatically from organizing campaigns only in the early 1980s, after facing over a decade of potent employer resistance to organizing (Windham 2017; Brenner, Brenner, and Winslow 2010). In the paper’s final section we review recent studies that reveal that a substantial share of the nonunion workforce desired collective bargaining during the pivotal 1970s, especially Black workers, and that this unmet demand for collective bargaining has escalated in recent years such that nearly half of nonunion workers, including those who are supervisors and ineligible, would vote to have union representation in their current jobs if given an opportunity to do so.

    We also are not able to explore fully the argument that unions missed the opportunities opened by the civil and women’s rights movements to diversify their ranks, and that the individual rights framework that undergirded these movements proved stronger than the collective New Deal framework that built unions and labor law (Lichtenstein 2013; Frymer 2008). Labor law effectively excluded many women and people of color because it did not cover the jobs they were most likely to hold, such as in agriculture and domestic work. For decades many unions excluded Black workers from their ranks and were riddled with deep-seated sexism; men and women of color and white women had to use the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as a tool to force open many unions (Katznelson 2005; Kessler-Harris 2001; Frymer 2008). Yet recent scholarship correctly emphasizes the complexity and diversity of the working-class people who sought to improve their lives through the labor movement. Despite unions’ racism and sexism, women and people of color were the most likely groups to unionize in the decades after the Civil Rights Act’s passage; they led many union organizing drives and inspired others to join them. Though it seemed that the promise of the New Deal and labor law would be open to everyone, when these workers tried to organize they ran into the wall of corporate resistance and weak labor law that we describe in the following pages. The fact that a new wave of women and people of color wanted unions but could not effectively organize in the 1970s is a major and often-overlooked piece of the puzzle of union decline (Windham 2017; MacLean 2006; Jones 2013; Cobble 2004; Deslippe 2000).

    This paper also does not account for the increased numbers of workers who may have lost union coverage because their firms moved or closed or else terminated the collective bargaining arrangement for other reasons. The increased erosion in membership among already-represented workers reflects a variety of factors: the regular ebb and flow of facility openings, closings, shrinkages, and expansions; faster-than-average growth in nonunion industries and occupations; and the anti-union animus of firms that increasingly ghettoized their organized operations by closing unionized units and opening nonunion ones.ii Much of the erosion of currently represented union workers reflects the fundamental rules of labor law that establish as a default rule representation at the individual-unit level of enterprises and do nothing to facilitate representation rights at the occupation or industry level, making maintaining union coverage exceedingly difficult, We also do not account for the increase in the numbers of jobs in categories that often fall outside of collective bargaining coverage, such as supervisors and contingent, contractual, or temporary workers.

    The paper proceeds through the following points and findings:

    • The big picture of union decline is the dramatic drop in new unionization in both the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors between the late 1960s and early 1980s, based on (1) fewer union elections, (2) a decline in union win rates in the elections that were held, and (3) the inability of the newly organized to obtain a first contract.
    • Employer resistance to union organizing sharply increased over the course of the 1970s, effected through aggressive management opposition, some of it, such as the firing of union activists, illegal; increased use of anti-union consultants; the weaponization of shutdown threats; and delaying tactics.
    • Decisions by courts and the NLRB, many of them emerging after passage of the anti-union Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, weakened bargaining power. These decisions include the prohibition against secondary boycotts; the banning by states of union security agreements; dramatically expanded management rights and the curtailment of the ability of unions to bargain with their employers about contracting-out decisions and plant closings; escalating use of striker replacements, especially after President Reagan normalized this employer behavior in the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) strike; the increased use of employer lockouts; and the exploitation of the toothlessness of labor law.
    • Globalization and automation, and the concurrent decline of manufacturing, can explain only a small portion of the decline in unionization. Private-sector unionization eroded rapidly in major sectors and in many detailed industries in nonmanufacturing, frequently to a greater extent than in manufacturing, and detailed statistical analyses show that changing employment patterns across industries can account for less than a fifth of union erosion. Moreover, international comparisons show that manufacturing decline explains very little of cross-country differences in union decline.
    • Polling data show that there has been a large unmet demand for collective bargaining, a finding that belies the argument that union decline has been the result of a lessened interest among workers in seeking collective bargaining.

    The big picture of private-sector union decline

    Union membership and union coverage (membership plus those covered by collective bargaining, even if not members) in the private sector has declined broadly in the United States. Our focus is on the private sector, since this is where unionization has dropped precipitously.

    The long-term erosion of the share of union membership in overall private-sector employment (or “union density”) since 1929 is shown in Figure A. The line is broken at about 1972 because there are two series. The first, for 1929–1972, is based on a series developed from union revenue data by Troy and Sheflin (1985, Appendix A, and published in Hirsch 2008). The second series, based on an analysis of Current Population Survey data by Hirsch and MacPherson (2020), covers the 1973–2019 period.

    The data in Figure A are sometimes erroneously interpreted as if there were a steady decline in union membership since the mid-1950s. This is not the case, as the decline greatly accelerated in the 1970s and 1980s.

    Figure A

    U.S. private-sector union membership rate, 1929–2019

    YearPercent union members (1929-1972)Percent union members (1973-2019)
    192912.4%
    193013.3%
    193114.0%
    193215.2%
    193315.5%
    193416.3%
    193514.2%
    193615.0%
    193719.5%
    193821.9%
    193922.8%
    194024.3%
    194125.9%
    194228.1%
    194330.8%
    194432.4%
    194533.9%
    194634.1%
    194734.9%
    194834.7%
    194934.9%
    195034.6%
    195134.7%
    195235.2%
    195335.7%
    195435.6%
    195535.1%
    195634.7%
    195734.7%
    195833.9%
    195932.3%
    196031.9%
    196131.9%
    196231.6%
    196331.2%
    196431.0%
    196530.8%
    196630.3%
    196730.5%
    196829.9%
    196929.0%
    197029.1%
    197128.2%
    197227.3%
    197324.5%
    197423.6%
    197521.7%
    197621.5%
    197721.7%
    197820.7%
    197921.2%
    198020.1%
    198118.7%
    198217.6%
    198316.5%
    198415.3%
    198514.3%
    198613.8%
    198713.2%
    198812.7%
    198912.3%
    199011.9%
    199111.7%
    199211.4%
    199311.1%
    199410.8%
    199510.3%
    199610.0%
    19979.7%
    19989.5%
    19999.4%
    20009.0%
    20019.0%
    20028.6%
    20038.2%
    20047.9%
    20057.8%
    20067.4%
    20077.5%
    20087.6%
    20097.2%
    20106.9%
    20116.9%
    20126.6%
    20136.7%
    20146.6%
    20156.7%
    20166.4%
    20176.5%
    20186.4%
    20196.2%
    ChartData Download data

    The data below can be saved or copied directly into Excel.

    The data underlying the figure.

    Notes: There is no definitive, fully time-consistent series on union membership as a share of employment. Figures for 1929–1972 were compiled by Troy and Sheflin (1985, Appendix A) from union financial reports; those for 1973 forward are compiled from Current Population Survey (CPS) household data (Hirsch and Macpherson, 2003, updated at http://www. unionstats.com). 1973–76 CPS figures adjusted to account for association members, who are included both in the Troy-Sheflin series and in the CPS beginning in 1977. 1973 CPS figure adjusted so that 73/77 CPS ratio equals 73/77 ratio in Troy and Sheflin.

    Table 1 provides metrics to assess the rate of decline, presented for the decades from 1950 to 2000 and then in the 2000s using the cyclical peak of 2007 as the dividing point; this distinction allows us to separately assess the business cycles of 2000–2007 and 2007–2019. Assessing the trends in the 1970s presents a problem because of the data discontinuity between 1972 and 1973, when there is an implied very large and implausible decline of 2.8 percentage points (if one assumes the series is continuous, which it is not). To deal with this problem, Table 1 presents the periods of 1970–1972 and 1973–1980 separately and constructs an “alternative 1970–1980” metric to reflect the trends in the whole decade using the 1970–1972 and 1973–1980 trends.iii

    Table 1

    Measures of rate of decline in private-sector union membership, various periods, 1950–2019

    Time periodChange in union membership rateAnnual percentage point change in union membership ratePercent decline in (10 yr) union membership rate
    1950–1960-2.7-0.27-7.8%
    1960–1970-2.8-0.28-8.8%
    1970–1972-1.8-0.90-30.9%
    1973–1980-4.4-0.62-25.5%
    Alt 1970–1980-6.8-0.68-28.9%
    1980–1990-8.2-0.82-40.8%
    1990–2000-2.9-0.29-24.4%
    2000–2007-1.5-0.21-23.8%
    2007–2019-1.3-0.11-14.4%

    For each period, Table 1 shows the absolute change in the union membership rate (column 1) and, to enable better comparisons across time, the annual percentage point change (column 2). These data tell us that the annual decline in private-sector union membership was far faster in the 1970s and 1980s (0.68 and 0.82 percentage points each year) than the relatively slow declines of the 1950s and 1960s (0.27 and 0.28 percentage points each year).

    Yet these comparisons alone fail to tell the full story, because the same annual percentage point decline represents a differing scale of erosion when the starting point is, say, 34.6%, as it was in 1950, and when it is 11.9%, as it was in 1990. To account for the differing size of union membership at the start of each period, the metric presented in column 3 is the percent decline in the union membership rate as a 10-year rate of change. This metric reveals that the union membership rate declined by 7.8% and 8.8% in the 1950s and 1960s, respectively, and then the decline more than tripled in the 1970s (to 28.9%) and more than quadrupled in the 1980s (to 40.8%). The rate of decline in union membership slowed to about 25% in the 1990s and early 2000s, a rate still triple the pace of the 1950–1970 period.

    What happened in the 1970s and 1980s that powered such a rapid decline in union density? A close look at union elections and first contracts in these years is revealing. In the United States, workers must clear three major hurdles if they want to form a union. First, unless workers can persuade their employers to recognize their union without going through the election process, at least 30% must sign union cards or petitions asking the government to hold a union election. Second, workers must win the government-sponsored election by a majority vote. Only then will the law require their employer to recognize the workers’ union and negotiate a union contract “in good faith.” The third hurdle is getting the employer to sign a first contract. Downward trends at each hurdle in the 1970s and later years relative to the1950–1970 period greatly help explain the dramatic decline of the inflow into unions and the associated erosion of the share of the workforce in private-sector unions.

    Building on earlier work (Windham 2017; Goldfield and Bromsen 2013), we present data showing that the combined impact of substantive changes in the 1970s and early 1980s at each stage of this process, i.e., a smaller percentage of the workforce voting in union elections, lower rates of election victories, and reductions in the rate of unions achieving first contracts, greatly reduced the numbers of workers clearing the hurdles.

    A smaller percentage of the workforce voting in elections

    Figure B presents the trend in worker efforts to clear the first hurdle by participating in an election at their workplace. It shows the share voting overall in private-sector NLRB elections as well as the share voting in elections that were successful, presented as a share of total nonagricultural private-sector wage-and-salary employment (these series and a parallel one that shows trends relative to private-sector production/nonsupervisory employment are presented in the appendix).

    Figure B

    Workers participating in NLRB elections as a share of nonagricultural employment, 1951–2009

    FY YearWorkers eligible in all electionsWorkers eligible in elections won by union
    19511.59%1.21%
    19521.81%1.37%
    19531.72%1.36%
    19541.21%0.81%
    19551.11%0.81%
    19561.02%0.64%
    19571.00%0.58%
    19580.77%0.43%
    19590.89%0.53%
    19601.02%0.60%
    19610.96%0.49%
    19621.11%0.63%
    19630.89%0.53%
    19641.06%0.57%
    19651.02%0.63%
    19661.06%0.60%
    19671.10%0.63%
    19680.94%0.48%
    19690.98%0.49%
    19701.01%0.53%
    19710.95%0.45%
    19720.94%0.47%
    19730.82%0.35%
    19740.80%0.29%
    19750.87%0.33%
    19760.68%0.24%
    19770.78%0.30%
    19780.60%0.22%
    19790.73%0.26%
    19800.65%0.24%
    19810.54%0.19%
    19820.33%0.11%
    19830.22%0.10%
    19840.26%0.12%
    19850.26%0.10%
    19860.26%0.09%
    19870.24%0.10%
    19880.24%0.10%
    19890.28%0.11%
    19900.26%0.09%
    19910.22%0.08%
    19920.21%0.08%
    19930.23%0.10%
    19940.20%0.08%
    19950.20%0.08%
    19960.20%0.07%
    19970.22%0.09%
    19980.23%0.09%
    19990.22%0.10%
    20000.22%0.10%
    20010.19%0.08%
    20020.16%0.07%
    20030.16%0.07%
    20040.15%0.07%
    20050.14%0.06%
    20060.11%0.06%
    20070.09%0.05%
    20080.10%0.06%
    20090.07%0.05%
    ChartData Download data

    The data below can be saved or copied directly into Excel.

    The data underlying the figure.

    Source: Authors' analysis of National Labor Relations Board annual reports, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

    These data were developed from NLRB election data published in NLRB annual reports and employment data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (see the appendix for details on the development of these NLRB election data and a discussion of measurement issues). By focusing on NLRB elections, these data understate the scale of organizing in the mid-1990s and later years because as many as 40-50% of newly organized workers were organized outside of the NLRB system, i.e., by “card check” or voluntary recognition by employers.

    Figure B illustrates that the percentage of the workforce voting in union elections began to lessen between the late 1960s and the late 1970s (as well as in the 50s), plummeted to very low levels by the early 1980s, and remained at very low levels thereafter. In the 1950s and 1960s, more than 1% of those employed (1.2% and 1.0%, respectively) participated in an NLRA election each year. Participation in elections fell to 0.78% of employment in the 1970s and to just 0.29% in the 1980s (Table 2). In the early 2000s just 0.13% of the employed were involved in NLRB elections, 90% below the election rate of the 1950s.

    Table 2

    Trends in NLRB elections and win rates

    PeriodTotal electionsElections wonEmployees eligible to voteWin rateShare of nonagricultural private wage-and-salary employment
    Eligible votersWorkers in election victories
    TotalElections wonElectionsVoters
    1951–19605,1553,410517,277354,64965.8%66.7%1.21%0.83%
    1961–19707,0714,165523,710285,85758.8%54.5%1.01%0.56%
    1971–19807,7123,944502,785202,08251.1%39.9%0.78%0.32%
    1981–19903,7821,828231,81088,07548.6%38.4%0.29%0.11%
    1991–20003,0021,513204,81683,75350.4%40.7%0.21%0.09%
    2001⁠–⁠20092,0441,209140,83769,86759.9%51.9%0.13%0.06%

     

    Source: Authors' analysis of National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) data and Bureau of Labor Statistics household employment data. See appendix for details.

    More workers losing their elections

    Over the years fewer workers have been able to successfully clear the second hurdle and win the union election, further dampening the inflow of new union members in the private sector. We can measure union election win rates in two ways, by elections and by voters, and there was a decline in both cases. In the 1940s, workers chose collective bargaining in 80% of the NLRB representation elections (Goldfield and Bromsen 2013). By 1977, however, they were losing more than half of the elections that they themselves had asked the government to hold.

    The percentage of eligible voters in NLRB elections who chose collective bargaining also shrank over this time (Table 2). In the 1950s two-thirds of the pool of workers voting in NLRB elections were able to win their union elections, but that rate fell to 55% among involved workers in the 1960s and to 40% in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.

    Fewer workers ever getting a first contract

    After a group of workers have made it over the first two hurdles—triggering an election and then winning that election—the final hurdle is to obtain a first contract with the employer. In the U.S. firm-based labor law system, if the workers are not able to obtain a first contract, then they don’t directly benefit from collective bargaining.

    While employers are required by law to bargain in good faith with workers over the contract, under the weak U.S. labor law system many employers drag their feet or only make a show of bargaining, knowing full well they can get away with it without serious penalty. Employers often slow-walk the bargaining process because the lack of a contract within a year can trigger a decertification election, with the workers losing their union representation rights.

    The number of workers who were able to obtain a first union contract after going through the NLRB election process has declined over the years. While 86% of workers who chose a union were able to win a first contract in the 1950s, that share declined to less than 70% in the 1970s. By the 1990s, it was down to 56%.iv

    Far fewer workers clearing the three hurdles to unionization

    By the late 1970s, far fewer workers than before were able to clear all three hurdles and cross the finish line to become union members with a contract. The inflow into unions became a mere trickle. Table 3, which compares the 1966–1968 period to the 1978–1980 period (assessing the years preceding and at the end of the pivotal decade), provides the relevant NLRB data and an analysis showing which factors drove the decline in workers obtaining new union contracts.v

    Table 3

    Impact of number of elections, win rates, and first contract rates on decline in workers obtaining first union contracts, 1966–1968 versus 1978–1980

    Erosion of:
    Share of workers in electionsShare of workers successful (win rate)First contract rateWorkers with new union contract
    As % of wage-and-salary employment
    1966–681.03%54.91%81.8%0.46%
    1978–800.66%36.44%69.9%0.17%
    Change
    Percentage-point change0.37%18.47%11.9%0.30%
    Percent contribution44.2%40.4%15.5%100.0%
    As % of production/nonsupervisory employment
    1966–681.22%54.91%81.8%0.55%
    1978–800.80%36.44%69.9%0.20%
    Change0.00%0.00%0.0%0.00%
    Percentage-point change0.43%18.47%11.9%0.35%
    Percent contribution43.1%41.1%15.8%100.0%

    Source: Authors' analysis of National Labor Relations Board data and Bureau of Labor Statistics household employment data (Table 2). See appendix for details on NLRB data.

    Table 3 shows that, while 0.46% of the nonagricultural wage-and-salary workforce were able to make it across the unionizing finish line in the 1966-1968 period, only 0.17% were able to do so by 1978–1980. Production/nonsupervisory workers experienced similar results These declines in the percentage of workers voting in elections, win rates, and first contract rates translate to roughly 210,000 fewer workers a year who were able to enter into the collective bargaining relationship by 1978–1980 than we would have expected if rates had held steady at the 1966–1968 level.

    Table 3 also presents analyses of the contribution of each hurdle to the deterioration of union membership. Within the nonagricultural wage-and-salary workforce (results are similar for the production/nonsupervisory workforce), 44.2% of the decline in the numbers of newly organized workers was due to a reduced share of workers voting in elections, 40.4% to a lesser win rate, and 15.5% to the decline in the ability to secure a first contract.

    The reduced flow of workers into union representation automatically led to a declining union share of employment because new membership is needed to offset the ongoing erosion of established collective bargaining units that occurs even absent anti-union animus (facilities and firms shut down, downsize, relocate, etc.) Narratives that focus on automation and globalization as drivers for union density’s decline ignore the more than 200,000 workers a year who, by the end of the 1970s, were no longer able to enter unions through the unionization process. This process, as we reveal in subsequent pages, became increasingly dysfunctional as employers increased their resistance to workers’ union organizing and first contract efforts in the 1970s.

    The fact that workers began to lose their freedom to enter unions had enormous implications for labor’s ability to grow. Figure C portrays the impact of the decline in successful union formation by showing the contribution of elections to overall private-sector union rates (computed at 10-year rate of change) in each period. These data represent workers who survived the first two hurdles—having an election and winning the election—but don’t reflect whether the workers won a first contract. The scale of successful union elections in the 1950s effectively added 8.7 percentage points to the overall share of union members in the private sector, all else equal. The contribution of successful elections to increasing union membership declined rapidly in each ensuing period so that by the 1980s the contribution was only 1.2 percentage points and by 2007–2017 just 0.5 percentage points.vi Even taking into account workers who are newly organized through card check and neutrality agreements does not change the overall picture that entry into unions has been substantially reduced over the last four decades compared to the 1950s and 1960s.

    Figure C

    Additions to private-sector membership rate from inflow of NLRB elections, 1951–2017

    Time periodOrganizing additions to density, 10–year rate
    1951–19608.7%
    1960–19705.5%
    1970–19803.2%
    1980–19901.2%
    1990–20000.9%
    2000–20070.8%
    2007–20170.5%
    ChartData Download data

    The data below can be saved or copied directly into Excel.

    The data underlying the figure.

    Source: National Labor Relations Board data. See appendix. Organizing inflow from number of voters in NLRB units that chose collective bargaining and does not take first contracts into account.

    These data on union membership and election trends yield two key conclusions. One is that the developments that eroded unions and new unionization did not occur gradually since the mid-1950s; rather, private-sector union erosion greatly intensified in the 1970s and 1980s. Understanding what happened in that particular period is therefore key to explaining private-sector union decline. The second conclusion is that the number of workers who were able to win union elections and get first contracts rapidly declined over the period from the late 1960s and into the early 1980s so that new unionization was not able to contribute much to maintaining the overall rate of union membership in the private sector starting in the 1980s. Understanding the suppression of union organizing is key to understanding union decline. This topic is addressed in the next section, which examines the institutional, political, legal, and management practices and strategies developed in the 1970s and 1980s that can account for the barriers workers faced at each step in the unionizing process.

    What happened to union organizing in the U.S. in the 1970s that accelerated unions’ decline?

    In the 1970s, U.S. corporations greatly increased their resistance to unions and union organizing, exploiting the weaknesses of U.S. labor laws to effectively squash workers’ right to organize and obtain collective bargaining. Workers in the United States historically have faced more employer opposition and less government support than workers in other nations. Active employer challenges to organizing and strikes, often coupled with government-led strike breaking and injunctions, helped defeat class-based uprisings in the late 19th century. In the early 20th century employers united to break workers’ organizing efforts with an open-shop drive, and they resisted workers’ rights in the making of the New Deal in the 1930s (Fantasia and Voss 2004; Greene 1998; Phillips-Fein 2009). During a window in the mid-20th century, from the 1940s to the 1960s, labor and management in the United States found a kind of uneasy balance that more closely resembled labor relations in European nations. Even then, however, unions were not strong in the South, and millions of women and people of color in domestic work and agriculture were left out because they held jobs not covered by labor law (Lichtenstein 2013).

    Starting in the 1970s, employers began to shift this balance once again. They became much more politically active than they had been in the mid-century years, and they began to push to limit government regulation on multiple fronts such as the environment, consumer rights, and labor (Hacker and Pierson 2010). As part of this renewed conservative activism, employers ramped up their resistance to established unions and new union organizing. They did so, in part, because they faced a new economic paradigm created by a variety of emerging trends. First, financialization shifted the locus of economic power from manufacturing to banks and investment firms. Second, U.S. corporations, which were the world’s economic leaders in the years after World War II, faced more global competition as countries like Germany and Japan got back on their feet. Third, the rate of profit for private business fell by 29% between 1965 and 1973, and among manufacturers it fell by more than 40% (Brenner 2006). And finally, U.S. employers were more heavily saddled by social welfare costs, like health care and pensions, than were their global competitors because of the U.S.’s employer-based social welfare system (Hacker 2002). To address social welfare costs, employers began to move to a lower-cost employment model in which they could avoid providing security and social welfare to their employees; these moves included hiring more temporary and part-time workers, shifting to subcontractors, and driving down wage and benefit standards. They also worked to limit new demands from the collective bargaining relationship, including by attacking new organizing efforts. “People began looking for ways to economize and found that…they had given it away in the contract,” remembers Douglas Soutar, co-founder of the Business Roundtable.vii Many corporations sought to limit the number of workers who could access collective bargaining and tried to keep workers from ever forming unions in the first place.

    Employers ramped up their resistance to unions as they faced a new wave of union organizing in the private sector, especially among a newly diversified workforce. Worker interest in unions remained high through the 1970s, and working people continued to try to organize in both the private and public sectors. Workers began to try to form unions in traditionally nonunion sectors of the economy, like retail and service, and throughout the South.

    Leading these drives were women and people of color who had long been excluded from many of the nation’s best jobs and were outside much of labor law’s purview. The 1964 Civil Rights Act gained them new access. Once they got the coveted jobs, they pushed to unionize (Windham 2017). Three million women joined unions’ ranks between the 1960s and 1970s, and by 1980 28% of union members were women (BLS 1980; Kistler 1984). Black workers were particularly interested in organizing. In 1977, 70% of blue-collar African Americans said that they would vote for a union (Quinn and Staines 1979). In fact, by the 1970s Black and Hispanic workers were the most likely demographic groups to be union members; in 1973, Black and Hispanic men’s unionization rates were 38%, far above the 24% rate of all workers (Table 4).viii Black women were the only group to increase their unionization rate in the 1970s; the peak of 22% in 1979 is double the rate for non-Hispanic white women. Because the question on union membership was changed in the Current Population Survey (the source of data in the table) between 1976 and 1977, the erosion of union membership is likely understated, and it is not possible to assess the understatement for particular race/gender groups (Hirsch, MacPherson, and Vroman 2001).ix

    Table 4

    Private-sector union membership rates, by race and gender, 1973–1980

    Private-sector union membership rate
     AllWhite*Black*Hispanic
    All workers
    197324.2%23.2%29.0%32.6%
    197423.422.727.428.6
    197521.520.826.925.1
    197621.320.428.724.7
    197721.720.828.425.4
    197820.719.727.925.0
    197921.220.128.924.7
    198020.118.927.525.2
    Male workers
    197331.0%30.0%38.1%37.7%
    197430.229.636.232.3
    197527.927.136.128.9
    197627.726.737.329.4
    197728.127.335.430.2
    197826.926.034.131.4
    197927.426.534.829.3
    198026.325.233.531.0
    Female workers
    197313.1%12.0%16.7%23.5%
    197412.411.515.621.9
    197511.610.715.318.5
    197611.610.717.216.9
    197712.211.019.716.8
    197811.610.320.313.6
    197912.310.821.516.6
    198011.410.120.315.8

    * Race and ethnicity are mutually exclusive.

    Source: May Current Population Survey, 1973–1980.

    Though people of color and women were particularly interested in unionizing, this diverse group of workers was increasingly unsuccessful in its organizing attempts because employers pushed to new heights their efforts to break and bend labor law. From 1970 to 1980, charges against employers for law breaking more than doubled, as did the number of illegal firings.x Employers also developed and honed a new set of techniques to fight union organizing, promulgated through business schools and the vastly expanded “union-avoidance” industry. This onslaught of resistance to union organizing shifted norms about what was right or fair when it came to workers’ rights. Employer law breaking was remarkably effective. While workers won roughly 80% of their union elections in the 1940s, by the late 1970s they won fewer than half (Goldfield 1987). By the time of the battle around labor law reform legislation during the Carter administration in the late 1970s, employers were using a new level of political activism to defend an emerging status quo that offered companies tremendous latitude to resist workers’ union organizing and establish a union-free environment.

    How workers lost the freedom to organize

    Over the course of the post-World War II period, U.S. workers’ right to organize in the private sector has evolved to the point where it is now stronger on paper than in practice. Though U.S. labor law guarantees most private-sector workers the freedom to form unions, that right has been effectively curtailed as constant conservative and employer opposition to organized labor swayed the government to gradually cede its role as referee. Legislative changes, court decisions, and judgments by the NLRB have diminished workers’ right to unionize. When employers faced a changed economic paradigm in the 1970s and 1980s, this process accelerated, and employers were able to effectively weaponize this legal regime to block new union organizing and to weaken unions.

    Many private-sector workers first gained a right to organize unions with the passage in 1935 of the NLRA, also known as the Wagner Act. The Wagner Act established a national policy of encouraging workers to organize into unions and engage in collective bargaining with their employers.xi Congress mandated that workers had the “full freedom of association” and protected their right to “designation of representatives of their own choosing, for purposes of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment….” Under the Wagner Act, if the government certified that the workers had a union, then the company was obligated to enter into collective bargaining. The act excluded some categories of private-sector workers, including farmworkers, domestic workers employed by a family in its home, independent contractors, and supervisors.

    In its early years, the law’s enforcement agency, the NLRB, required employers to remain neutral on the issue of a union, leaving the choice on collective bargaining solely up to the employees involved. In 1941 the Supreme Court decided that employers could weigh in during elections as long as they were not “coercive,” but the board’s enforcement remained vigorous in this period and workers were still routinely able to form unions.

    A Republican Congress, urged on by employers wanting to curtail unions’ power, successfully revised the Wagner Act with the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, passing it over a presidential veto. The Taft-Hartley Act weakened unions’ power on many fronts, including making it more difficult for workers to form unions and enter into collective bargaining. For example, it added language that became known as the “employer free speech” clause, affirmatively stating that an employer’s expression of views regarding unionization is not prohibited unless the employer’s statement contains an offer of benefit or threat of reprisal if workers choose to unionize..xii Employers relied on this language to engage in anti-union campaigns in ways that were previously found illegal under the Wagner Act, for example through extensive use of forced-attendance company meetings against the union, or “captive audience” meetings, a practice that was professionalized (via a new anti-union consultant industry) and used extensively in the 1970s. Taft-Hartley also added new unfair labor practices against unions and made explicit that workers could refrain from organizing activitiesxiii (Gross 1981; Becker 1991–1993). Taft-Hartley also added provisions allowing employers to file representation petitions to determine whether their employees wanted union representation.xiv Previously, the petition process had only been available to employers faced with organizing drives by competing unions.

    Employers tried again to further weaken labor law in the 1960s. A number of the leaders of the nation’s largest corporations, including General Electric, Ford, and US Steel, began in late 1965 an effort to roll back the laws protecting workers’ organizing and bargaining rights through a new alliance, the Labor Law Reform Group (LLRG). The executives circulated a study among members of Congress in 1967 detailing 23 changes in labor law that would benefit employers. The changes professed to strengthen employer “free speech,” insist on “meaningful” bargaining units, and “prevent improper remedies” for employer unfair labor practices during representation campaigns, for example (Gross 1995; Windham 2017). The LLRG aimed to win its changes after the 1968 elections, but the group’s hopes were dashed when Congress remained Democratic. The LLRG soon merged with two other employer groups in 1972 to form the Business Roundtable, which began to successfully win its proposed changes, largely through litigation before the NLRB.xv

    The five-member NLRB is appointed by the president and generally reflects the party in power. Under President Nixon, the NLRB quickly began erecting more obstacles in the way of organizing. It allowed employers to tell organizing workers that signing union cards would be “fatal” and cause “turmoil,” that if they chose a union they could lose what they had because bargaining “starts from scratch” and “everything is up for negotiation.” The board decided that employers legally could predict that they would have to close up shop due to financial difficulties if the workers voted yes.xvi The NLRB under the Carter administration did little to reverse the trend of weakening labor law that would persist and deepen in the Reagan years (Gross 1995).

    Employers won a major victory in the U.S. Supreme Court in 1974 that allowed them to deny recognition to a union even if a majority of workers signed cards or petitions indicating their support for forming one. The card check method of forming a union, also called majority signup or voluntary recognition, has been a standard feature in U.S. labor relations since before the passage of the Wagner Act, and it is expressly recognized in the act. But the Supreme Court ruled in Linden Lumber (1974) that employers may refuse to recognize unions based on a showing of majority support and insist on an NLRB election. This requirement undermined the ability of workers to form unions because it subjected them to the NLRB election process and the attendant delays and employer anti-union campaigns.

    Over the decades, such decisions by the NLRB and the courts steadily increased employers’ power to weigh in on elections and curtailed workers’ right to form unions. Consider the way policy drift in the law created two separate standards for how employers and unions are allowed to communicate with workers. Prior to passage of Taft-Hartley, the NLRB had ruled that employers violated the law and committed an unfair labor practice when they held mandatory meetings of employees to express anti-union views.xvii Within a year of Taft-Hartley’s enactment, the NLRB decided that employers could legally force workers to attend such captive audience meetings. The NLRB announced that it would find the meetings unlawful only if the employers threatened workers or promised some new benefit. The NLRB also reversed its earlier rulings that employers who hold captive audience meetings must allow unions an opportunity to respond. As a result, employers got the green light to hold mandatory anti-union meetings, and unions were denied the legal right to enter the employer’s premises to respond.

    The Supreme Court expanded the problem in 1956 when it ruled in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox that employers are not required to give union organizers access to parking lots to talk with employees unless the union lacks alternative means of reaching employees.xviii The decision exacerbated an existing imbalance in communications during union organizing campaigns that greatly restricts and limits union organizers’ access to employees and employees’ ability to hear from union organizers at the workplace.xix A series of subsequent decisions gave employers a free hand to ban union supporters from captive audience meetings and even ban employees from speaking during the meetings.

    By the 1970s, employers began to put their legal prerogative to hold such meetings to increased use. They routinely cherry-picked the workers who were undecided about the union, forced them to attend coercive meetings against the union, and were never required to allow the union equal say (Becker 1991–1993). The number of employers requiring such meetings increased by a third in the 1970s through the 1990s.xx By the end of the 20th century, 92% of employers held these forced attendance meetings (Bronfenbrenner 2000). The result is that management became able to communicate to employees in one-on-one conversations between direct supervisors and workers and in mandatory group meetings at work sites while union organizers were required to meet employees offsite and after hours, greatly complicating their ability to communicate with employees.

    Policy drift in labor law meant that over time employers also gained more freedom to threaten to shut down if the workers voted for a union. At first, the NLRB seemed to support workers on this issue; it softened Taft-Hartley’s impact soon after its General Shoe decision in 1948, requiring that union elections must take place in “laboratory conditions” free from a coercive atmosphere. Nevertheless, in the early 1950s the NLRB decided that an employer was within legal bounds when it predicted it would have to close to meet unions’ wage demands. The board reversed that rule in 1962, deciding that such predictions of company closure were actually threats. But the threats became more potent in 1965 when the U.S. Supreme Court held that a company does not illegally discriminate against union supporters when it shuts down its business entirely in order to avoid unionization.xxi Employers cannot lawfully close one facility in order to chill union organizing at another facility, or transfer work from a union shop to a nonunion shop to avoid the union (the “runaway shop”), but the burden of proving that the decision was motivated by anti-union animus and not business reasons has proven difficult.xxii The court handed management a powerful rhetorical weapon to suggest that if workers successfully unionize then the facility may be closed, diminished, or moved. In the 1970s, the NLRB went even further, making threats of closure legal again as long as the company did not threaten to close solely because of the union.xxiii Employers dramatically expanded their threats of closure in the 1970s, as discussed below. By the 1990s, half of all employers facing worker organizing campaigns threatened to shut down if the workers formed a union (Bronfenbrenner 2000).

    Acceleration of employer attacks on union organizing in the 1970s

    Even though U.S. labor law left workers vulnerable, most major industrial employers, especially in the more unionized Northeast and Midwest, more or less complied with laws protecting workers’ right to organize from the 1940s through the mid-1960s. Beginning in the 1970s, however, employers tried to limit labor costs, including by restricting workers’ ability to enter into unions and collective bargaining.

    When workers tried to exercise their right to vote for a union, employers exploited these previously described weaknesses in the U.S. labor law regime and began to break and circumvent the law at new levels. They learned through experience that labor law violations carried no real penalty and no real public stigma. Employer threats, mandatory anti-union meetings, and illegal firings paid off. By 1977, unionizing workers began to lose more than half of their elections for the first time since the Wagner Act’s inception (Goldfield 1987).

    Labor law still prohibits employers from firing or threatening workers for supporting the union, as well as spying on workers, threatening to shut down if the workers vote in favor of a union, or promising workers more money or perks if they reject a union. The NLRB considers such acts “unfair labor practices” (ULPs), and charges against employers for ULPs rose sevenfold between 1950 and 1980xxiv (Figure D). These were not empty charges. Indeed, in 1980 alone the NLRB required employers to pay workers backpay in more than 15,000 cases after illegally firing them or cutting their pay as retribution for union activity, a record level at that point (Goldfield and Bromsen 2013).

    Figure D

    Number of unfair labor practices (ULP) charges against employers: 1950–1990

    8(a)1
    19504472
    19524306
    19544373
    19563522
    19586068
    19607723
    19629231
    196410695
    196610902
    196811892
    197013601
    197217733
    197417978
    197623496
    197827056
    198031281
    198131273
    198227749
    198328995
    198424852
    198624084
    198822266
    199024075
    ChartData Download data

    The data below can be saved or copied directly into Excel.

    The data underlying the figure.

    Source: National Labor Review Board annual reports, 1950–1990 8(a)1 unfair labor practice charges. For years 1954–1990, see Table 2 and Table 4. For 1950, see Table 3A and Table 10. For 1952, see Table 2 and Table 3.

    Yet the penalties for labor law violations are scant. No fines are levied, no employer goes to jail, and any costs incurred are negligible. Typically, if the NLRB finds that an employer illegally fired a union supporter, for instance, that company simply has to rehire the worker, pay back wages (minus what the worker earned at another job, or could have earned, in the meantime), and post a sign in the breakroom explaining that it broke the law. Workers do not receive monetary damages to compensate them for the economic harms inflicted by their illegal treatment. Unlike other employment laws, workers have no right to bring a lawsuit against the employer for violating their NLRA rights; they are entirely dependent on the agency pursuing their case. In contrast, other employment laws, such as civil rights laws, provide much greater penalties and provide for a private right of action so workers can bring cases on their own and collect attorneys’ fees if they prevail (Weil 2005).

    If the employer violates labor law multiple times during a campaign, then the NLRB can order a new election, but even a new election cannot erase the original threats’ effects. Occasionally the NLRB will order a labor law violator to bargain with its workers (a so-called “bargaining order”), but this process usually takes years, and the courts have been resistant to these orders. Bargaining orders issued by the NLRB have dropped from more than a hundred per year to a small fraction of that, and rarely result in a collective bargaining agreement (Brudney 1996, 1581–87).

    The fact that labor law is so toothless means that employers have an economic incentive to violate it. The law really protects workers only when employers more or less voluntarily comply with it.

    Starting in the 1970s, many more mainstream, large companies became far less willing to act in accordance with the law. Fortune 500 firms with longstanding bargaining relationships ramped up their resistance to union organizing; they skirted the law, delayed at every step, and increasingly spoke out against new union organizing, even when some of their workers were already covered by collective bargaining agreements. “It requires a certain nerve for those companies whose names you see in the batting order of big hitters in the bargaining game to try to keep plants unorganized,” a vice president of BF Goodrich told an industrial relations convention in 1978. “Management is more sophisticated and bolder…and the times ‘they are a-changing'” (Pestillo 1978). Union-busting tactics moved squarely into the industrial sector, the area where unions had traditionally been the strongest and which had long formed the core of the nation’s economy. An analysis of the ratio of the number of ULPs to the number of petitions filed within specific sectors is revealing. Not only did the level of lawbreaking per election shoot up in the 1970s, but industrial-sector workers were more intensely subjected to employer resistance than were workers in the service and retail sectors, which were traditionally less unionized, though resistance greatly increased in all sectors (Figure E).xxv

    Figure E

    Ratio of ULPs (CA) filed against employers to petitions filed for union certification (RC), by sector: 1950–1980

    YearManufacturingRetailService
    19500.50.40.8
    19530.50.50.6
    19550.60.50.5
    19580.80.60.9
    19600.80.71.1
    19631.00.81.0
    19651.01.01.0
    19681.00.90.9
    19701.41.01.0
    19731.51.31.2
    19752.21.51.2
    19782.82.22.0
    19803.72.72.2
    ChartData Download data

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    The data underlying the figure.

    Notes: CA cases are charges of unfair labor practices against employers under Section 8(a)1 of the National Labor Relations Act. RC elections are those triggered by workers who are trying to form a union.

    Source: National Labor Review Board annual reports, 1950–1980.

    Normalization of union busting by management consultants and business schools

    Managers who had long begrudgingly accommodated unions faced a learning curve when it came to outright avoiding them. In response, a large anti-union consultant industry stepped up to lead the way in the 1970s. These anti-union firms, often hand-in-hand with the nation’s business schools, taught business that “busting” unions was acceptable behavior and that good management meant remaining union-free. Through an avalanche of seminars, trainings, books, and speeches, these new management consultants helped make mainstream a level of anti-unionism that had been extreme in the mid-century labor-management arrangement. “Any management that gets a union deserves it—and they get the kind they deserve,” was the mantra of one sought-after consultant (Hughes 1976). The consultants helped entrench the concept that managers could and should avoid unions in all arenas, and so helped further deactivate labor law’s worker protections.

    Anti-union labor consultants weren’t entirely new; the nation’s first anti-union firm, Labor Research Associates (LRA), was formed in 1939 in Chicago. Yet management resistance to unions in the earlier decades was neither as widespread nor as accepted as it would be by the 1970s and 1980s. While there were just a handful of anti-union consulting firms in the beginning of the 1970s, by decade’s end there were hundreds. One management firm founder told a congressional hearing in 1979 that his industry grew tenfold over the preceding decade, and the AFL-CIO estimated that a full 70% of all campaigns involved some sort of management consultant (Logan 2006; U.S. Congress 1980).

    Business schools and professors were also key in shifting management’s values on unions. By the 1970s, U.S. business managers were far more likely to have gone to business school than in previous decades, and they were far more likely to do so than managers in other industrialized nations (Locke and Spender 2011). Business schools in the 1970s began to teach students that unions were an unnecessary expense on the cost and balance sheet and tutored them in how to avoid unionization. One frequent contributor to Harvard Business School case studies, for example, instructed that since the NLRB response process to employer unfair labor practices was so lengthy and the penalties “quite mild,” “it is quite possible for management to effectively destroy an organizing effort or, at the very least, signal to employees the relative ineffectiveness of the union in dealing with management” (Fulmer 1982). One California State University business professor asserted that, “In all but the most unusual circumstances it is almost negligent for a company to allow unionization to happen….When one surveys all the things a nonunion employer can do to stay that way…the employer would almost have to try to get itself organized to end up with a union” (Kilgour 1981). Universities themselves began to host the myriad of anti-union seminars made available by union consultants. The University of Delaware, Denver University, the University of San Francisco, the University of Alabama, Clemson, and Wake Forest were among the schools hosting such seminars in the late 1970s. According to the AFL-CIO, one consultant boasted of having taught at 30 universities (McDonald and Wilson 1979).

    Management consultants built their businesses by stoking fears based in racism and sexism and by teaching employers how to beat back their diversified workforces’ organizing efforts. One anti-union management consultant warned, “Danger: a union can muster a most potent campaign when it can take advantage of a ‘racial’ or ‘sexist’ theme” (Jackson 1981). Another told a Wake Forest University seminar in 1979 to try to limit the number of African American workers it hired in order to stay union-free. “Blacks tend to be more prone to unionization than whites,” he told the managers in the closed-door session. “If you can keep them at a minimum, you are better off.”xxvi In Confessions of a Union Buster, Marty Levitt spelled out how his firm, Three M (for Modern Management Methods), developed tactics to “awaken within the mostly white supervisor corps a hatred of blacks…contempt for women, mistrust of the poor…” (Levitt and Conrow 1993). Many of the consultants rang alarm bells for the mostly male management class about women’s interest in union organizing. “All indications are that women are now more inclined to vote union than men,” warned one anti-union specialist. “This is entirely consistent with the women’s movement, by whatever name…” (Kilgour 1982).

    Anti-union consultants instructed clients in how to avoid unions completely, often by opening nonunion facilities, hiring people who were the least likely to unionize, and by being perfectly clear that the company philosophy was nonunion. The consultant Charles Hughes trained over 27,000 managers and supervisors how to “remain union-free” between 1974 and 1984 (Logan 2006). Stephen Cabot, a Philadelphia lawyer, helped firms decide where to locate in order to remain nonunion, sometimes even identifying specific areas of cities where workers were the least likely to unionize (Wall Street Journal 1979). By 1983, nearly half of firms identified remaining union-free as their most pressing labor relations goal (Freeman and Kleiner 1990).

    Much of the anti-union consultants’ work, however, came after workers already showed interest in a union. Once employers realized that their workforces were signing union cards, they often called in consultants to usher them through the union campaigns, step-by-step, in order to defeat the workers’ organizing efforts. Consultants often spent weeks at the worksite, training supervisors and offering advice, though rarely appearing before the workforce.

    Consultants made good use of the predictable patterns in an NLRB election process. First, at least 30% of workers had to sign union cards or petitions showing an interest in a union, after which they petitioned the NLRB to hold an election. Consultants advised employers how to discourage card signing. Alfred DeMaria, a high-profile management consultant, advised employers that, “The Board has approved some surprisingly strong employer statements.” As an example, he noted, “One employer was lawful when it told its workers, ‘Don’t sign any cards; they can be fatal to business'” (DeMaria 1982).

    The next step in the election process was for the union and company to work out the “bargaining unit,” or the specifics of who could vote. Consultants urged employers to demand a protracted NLRB hearing to determine which workers got to cast ballots. “Always go to hearing…. I have yet to see a situation where time worked against the employers in an election,” urged management consultant Fred Long in an executive meeting captured on tape by a union infiltrator in 1975, a transcript of which surfaced in a 1979 congressional hearing. “Suffice it to say, you have at least 500 issues. So you litigate those issues….You could come up with them for almost a year, as we did in one case” (U.S. Congress 1980, 1:208). Such delays cost organizing workers dearly. One study found that each month of delay between the filing of the petition and the election decreased the workers’ chance of winning the election by 2.5% (Kistler 1984). Consultants also instructed employers how to manipulate the loopholes in the NLRB process in order to seed the voting group with as many no votes as possible. “Hire five of your relatives on a regularly scheduled part-time basis….You have 60 days to hire even a hell of a lot of people if you need to,” continued Long to the gathered executives.

    Once the election was finally scheduled, employers launched intense campaigns against the workers’ unionization effort. Some firms developed elaborate systems to track and sway union sentiments among workers. One “highly confidential management document” instructed supervisors at Cannon Mills in 1982 to rate each worker in their department from strongest for the company to the weakest, and to profile employees by race, sex, and age.xxvii

    Employers learned how to threaten unionizing workers with loss of benefits and strikes while skirting the legal prohibitions on such threats. Through letters, speeches, and flyers employers made clear to workers that the company would not really have to offer anything new if the workers won the right to collective bargaining. “The Hotel does not have to agree to a single thing the union proposes so long as we bargain in good faith,” asserted the Boardwalk Regency Hotel in Atlantic City.xxviii Warnings about strikes often featured prominently in the anti-union campaigns. “Tell employees that the law permits the hiring of a permanent replacement for anyone who engages in an economic strike,” urged Brandeis University to its supervisors in 1976 when librarians tried to unionize.xxix

    Employers learned how to legally threaten workers with plant closure if the union won the election. For example, one General Electric facility in Goldsboro, N.C. faced a union drive in 1978, and issued the following thinly veiled threat: “Cleveland Welds…was represented by the IUE, as were a number of other plants that have closed, including Cleveland Lamp plant, Oakland Lamp plant….Don’t mistake me. I’m not saying we will automatically lose our business if the Union wins the election. But it’s clear that unions…can, and they do, hurt people’s job security.”xxx

    The threat of plant closure held enormous sway in the climate of capital flight in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In fact, many U.S. manufacturers used globalization as a weapon against workers’ unionization efforts. For example, the financier David E. Murdock bought Cannon Mills in 1982, and when the workers then tried to form a union he used the threat of global competition in textiles to successfully beat back their unionization attempt: “If I determine that Cannon cannot operate competitively, I can and I will cease to operate Cannon,” he told them in mandatory-attendance meetings. “This is my decision, and mine alone, and no one can stop me—including this Union”xxxi (Windham 2017).

    If the workers did manage to win a campaign, employers routinely delayed or avoided actually signing a collective bargaining agreement—the very relationship that the entire election process was designed to facilitate. One AFL-CIO survey found that among workers who won elections, only 63% ever actually got a union contract.xxxii If all else failed, consultants taught employers the ins and outs of decertifying a union already in place. While it is technically illegal for an employer to assist or promote a decertification petition by employees, employers routinely do so (Shawe 1979). The number of decertification elections doubled between 1972 and 1982.xxxiii

    The labor movement tried to fight back, and in 1977–1978 it sought to strengthen workers’ rights to form unions and strike through the Labor Law Reform Act. Though the Business Roundtable was at first split on whether to oppose the bill, a broad coalition of American businesses ultimately mounted a massive, coordinated campaign to leave weak labor law unchanged (Stein 2010, 187; Waterhouse 2013). Ironically, some of the same businessmen who had wanted to change labor law as part of the LLRG in the late 1960s later defended the broken status quo because it so aptly suited their purposes. Business had become far more politically active than ever by the late 1970s, and the number of registered lobbyists for business firms increased by fourfold over the decade (Vogel 1989). Business put this new organized power to work against the bill. After a 19-day filibuster and five attempts to get the 60 votes needed for cloture in the Senate, labor and its supporters had to admit defeat. In an “Open Letter to American Business” in the Wall Street Journal, AFL-CIO President George Meany asked business, “Why? What is your motivation?…Where is the moral basis for your attacks? Is not the real intent of this attack the destruction of the uniquely American system of collective bargaining….Do you want to destroy trade unionism?”xxxiv United Auto Workers President Douglas Fraser denounced the “one-sided class war” that broke “and discarded the fragile, unwritten compact” between labor and business.xxxv

    The employer campaigns against unionization in the 1970s were remarkably potent. On paper U.S. workers still had the right to organize, but by the end of the decade they were losing it in practice as they faced defeat in more than half of the elections that they themselves had triggered. The AFL-CIO’s assistant organizing director told Congress in 1984, “I’ve been involved in organizing off and on…since 1967 and can assert categorically that the state of the art in employer resistance to employees’ organizing efforts has achieved a level of sophistication and effectiveness far exceeding that of the late ’60s and early ’70s.”xxxvi Doreen Lavasseur, a union organizer who helped university and clerical workers organize throughout the decade, remembers the ground-level impact of the employer campaign on workers: “I would just watch these people go from feeling strong and like we need to do something to feeling like totally terrified to do anything, and paralyzed.”xxxvii The rise in employer law breaking, the spread of employer anti-union campaigns deep into the nation’s core industries, and the tutorials of union consultants coalesced to undermine workers’ freedom to form unions by the end of the 1970s, and it has never recovered.

    The unraveling of workers’ bargaining power under the law

    By the end of the 1970s, employers had fully exposed the shortcomings and weaknesses of the NLRA and learned how to exploit the union-restrictive provisions of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act to undermine and defeat union organizing. Employers knew they could vigorously campaign against unions and even break the law by firing union activists without facing any real financial penalties or consequences. Yet employers did not stop there. They also attacked existing unions and curtailed the bargaining power of unionized workers. They began to replace strikers far more frequently, limited what workers could bargain about, began to lock workers out in disputes, and even began bargaining to impasse in order to force strikes. By the early 1980s, they began to demand across-the-board concessions in many contract negotiations. In addition, the shift of power from manufacturing to finance meant that the banks’ and shareholders’ needs often took precedence over those of workers. Though workers were going to the bargaining table with factory owners, the entity with the real power was often a financier on Wall Street (Davis 2009; Stein 2010; Applebaum and Batt 2014).

    Employers were able to squeeze unions so effectively because, over the years, labor law had become heavily tilted against workers and toward employers. Though these employer-friendly laws were on the books in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, it was not until the 1970s that employers began to take full advantage of their power. Several key developments set the stage for this 1970s unraveling of workers’ bargaining power under the law. First, a Republican Congress largely neutered workers’ leverage in passing the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act over President Truman’s veto. Second, Taft-Hartley forced the NLRB to prioritize, over all other cases, including cases involving illegal firings of union supporters, litigation against unions for engaging in so-called secondary activity. Third, the law’s ineffective remedies became obvious, and the NLRB’s efforts to hold employers accountable for violating the law were stymied in the courts. Fourth, employers increasingly found an ally in the U.S. Supreme Court, which issued a series of decisions restricting workers’ rights, expanding employer power, and limiting employers’ bargaining obligations. Finally, employers started making greater use of replacement workers during strikes—a trend that grew in the 1970s and 1980s and significantly undermined workers’ right to strike. The cumulative impact of these factors meant that by the 1970s the law did not effectively protect workers’ bargaining power and gave employers a wealth of tools to resist unionization.

    The impact of Taft-Hartley

    The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act dramatically weakened workers’ bargaining power in several ways. As noted in the previous section, it strengthened employers’ influence on the organizing process by giving employers more leeway on speaking out against the union and allowing employers themselves to file representation petitions. Taft-Hartley also authorized states to ban “union security” agreements, under which employers and unions agree that all represented employees should share in the cost of union representation through either union dues or fair share fees. This change allowed states to pass laws (so-called “right-to-work” laws) allowing workers to obtain the benefits of union representation without contributing toward the costs, creating a free-rider problem designed to undermine unions.xxxviii Recent research has shown that right-to-work laws have had substantial direct and indirect impacts on wages and wage inequality (VanHeuvelen 2020).

    Taft-Hartley also imposed new restrictions on “secondary boycotts,” the picketing of other employers to put pressure on the workers’ own employer, discussed next.

    NLRB decisively ends union secondary boycotts

    As soon as Taft-Hartley became law, employers saw the power and benefit of its new ban on employee secondary activity. Unlike other violations of the NLRA, under Taft Hartley violations of the prohibition on secondary activity against so-called “neutral” employers are subject to civil lawsuits and money damages by employers against unions. The NLRB is statutorily mandated to seek federal court injunctions against unions engaged in secondary boycott activity and to give these cases priority over all other cases, including those alleging illegal conduct by employers against workers forming unions.xxxix

    The resulting enforcement disparity was stark and immediate. The ratio of unfair labor practice charges against unions compared to charges against employers grew from one in four in 1948 to half in 1956 (Figure F). Injunctions against unions for alleged secondary activity grew from 17 in 1948 (the first year such injunctions were authorized) to 127 10 years later. Injunctions against unions grew further to 219 by 1960, an astonishing 1,188% increase from 1948. During this same period, the NLRB pursued almost no injunctions against employers for unfair labor practices.xl Taft-Hartley quickly succeeded in shutting down one of workers’ most powerful economic weapons.

    Figure F

    Growth of charges for secondary boycott violations: 10(l) charges, 1948–1960

    10l
    194817
    194932
    195022
    195132
    195235
    195344
    195466
    195559
    195678
    195798
    1958127
    1959129
    1960219
    ChartData Download data

    The data below can be saved or copied directly into Excel.

    The data underlying the figure.

    Source: National Labor Review Board annual reports, 1948–1960.

    In stark contrast to the mandatory federal court injunction procedure for violations by unions of the secondary boycott restrictions, no such mandatory injunction proceedings are available for retaliation or discrimination against workers for supporting a union. And while employers have the ability to sue unions in court and win money damages for violations of the secondary boycott provisions, workers have no similar ability to sue their employers for money damages for violating their NLRA rights (Human Rights Watch 2000).

    Erosion of collective bargaining rights by the Supreme Court

    The erosion of workers’ bargaining power was further exacerbated by a number of significant decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court. These rulings limited access to the workplace by union organizers; undermined the remedies available to the NLRB for violations of the law; greatly constrained the right of workers and their unions to bargain with employers over contracting, plant closing, and other decisions impacting the bargaining unit; and expanded employers’ economic leverage during labor disputes by allowing them to proactively lock out employees. Each of these decisions significantly weakened workers’ bargaining power. Taken together, they undermined an already weak law and tilted it away from workers and in employers’ favor.xli

    Narrowing of the mandatory scope of bargaining

    One line of Supreme Court decisions dramatically expanded management rights and curtailed the ability of workers and unions to bargain with their employers about contracting-out decisions, plant closings, and other issues affecting the bargaining unit. At the urging of employers wanting to narrow the scope of topics about which they were required to bargain with their workers’ unions, the Supreme Court deemed these topics “managerial” and beyond the scope of mandatory bargaining.

    This series of decisions started with the Supreme Court’s 1964 ruling in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, which involved an employer’s decision to contract out the work performed by bargaining unit employees. The Eisenhower NLRB, which was considered employer-friendly, initially ruled that the employer was not legally obligated to bargain over what the board deemed a “basic management” decision. The Kennedy NLRB reversed that decision, and in the ensuing uproar the employer community went to Congress and the Supreme Court for relief (Gross 1995, 172–74). The Supreme Court affirmed the Kennedy NLRB’s ruling that the employer was legally required to bargain in this instance, which the court majority described narrowly as “contracting out of plant maintenance work previously performed by employees in the bargaining unit, which the employees were capable of continuing to perform.”xlii The court noted that requiring bargaining over the decision furthered the policies and purposes of the NLRA:

    [A]lthough it is not possible to say whether a satisfactory solution could be reached, national labor policy is founded upon the congressional determination that the chances are good enough to warrant subjecting such issues to the process of collective negotiation.

    Still, the Fibreboard majority limited the reach of its decision to the facts presented, explicitly noting that “[o]ur decision need not and does not encompass other forms of ‘contracting out’ or ‘subcontracting’ which arise daily in our complex economy.”

    A concurring opinion in Fibreboard by Justice Stewart contained a statement that would come to frame the law governing managerial decisions that have an impact on employees’ jobs. He opined:

    Nothing the Court holds today should be understood as imposing a duty to bargain collectively regarding such managerial decisions, which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control. Decisions concerning the commitment of investment capital and the basic scope of the enterprise are not, in themselves, primarily about conditions of employment, though the effect of the decision may be necessarily to terminate employment. If, as I think clear, the purpose of § 8(d) is to describe a limited area subject to the duty of collective bargaining, those management decisions which are fundamental to the basic direction of a corporate enterprise or which impinge only indirectly upon employment security should be excluded from that area.

    Seventeen years later, in 1981, Justice Stewart’s views formally became the majority view in First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB.xliii There, the Supreme Court ruled that employers have no duty to bargain over a decision to terminate a contract for business—even when that decision results in the layoff of bargaining unit employees. The company involved in First National Maintenance provided cleaning and housekeeping services, and it terminated a contract to provide services to a nursing home without first bargaining with the union representing its housekeeping employees, who then lost their jobs. The Supreme Court characterized the decision made by the employer as “involving a change in the scope and direction of the enterprise,” which the court said “is akin to the decision whether to be in business at all.” The court concluded:

    …the harm likely to be done to an employer’s need to operate freely in deciding whether to shut down part of its business purely for economic reasons outweighs the incremental benefit that might be gained through the union’s participation in making the decision, and we hold that the decision itself is not part of 8(d)’s “terms and conditions” over which Congress has mandated bargaining.

    Under First National Maintenance, therefore, employers are required to bargain with their employees’ union over the effects of decisions to cancel contracts, restructure, or cease some or all operations, but not over the decisions themselves, which the courts view as “managerial” decisions. These decisions on the scope of bargaining obligations significantly undermine workers’ and unions’ bargaining power and deprive them of the ability to participate in and shape decisions and actions by their employers that affect the employer’s ongoing operations and employment.

    Giving employers economic leverage in labor disputes

    Allowing striker replacements. Under U.S. labor law, it is illegal for an employer to fire or retaliate against a worker for engaging in “protected, concerted activity” such as a strike, but in a twisted anomaly, employers are legally permitted to hire “permanent replacements” for strikers’ jobs. In an early decision from the first days of the Wagner Act, the Supreme Court indicated in dicta (language not part of the legal holding in the case) that an employer whose employees were engaged in an economic strike, as contrasted with a strike over unfair labor practices, could permanently replace striking employees without violating the NLRA.xliv This rule significantly undermines workers’ legal right to strike, because workers faced with deciding whether to strike over economic issues know that they can be permanently replaced by other workers and lose their jobs.

    Until the 1970s, few employers used the practice of replacing strikers because it was considered so confrontational. But the practice of permanently replacing strikers “sharply increased” in 1975 and became a much more prominent practice in the 1980s (LeRoy 1995; Stelzner 2017; Logan 2008). This practice escalated after the very public example of President Reagan replacing striking air traffic controllers and breaking the PATCO strike. Although the air traffic controllers’ strike was illegal, Reagan nevertheless established a new norm for employer behavior (McCartin 2006). Major employers, including Greyhound, Phelps Dodge, Massey, Caterpillar, Colt Industries, Bridgestone/Firestone, and the Chicago Tribune Co., were emboldened to hire, or threaten to hire, permanent replacements during legal strikes.xlv One of the most prominent incidents of permanent replacements took place at International Paper in Jay, Maine and two neighboring plants. More than 2,300 workers participated in a 16-month strike that ended unsuccessfully after the company hired permanent replacements.xlvi The dispute divided a small town and created lingering bitterness between strikers, the company, and the community.xlvii

    The General Accounting Office (now the General Accountability Office) reported that employers announced that they would hire permanent replacements in about one-third of the strikes in 1985 and 1989, and actually hired them in approximately 17% of all strikes (GAO 1991).

    McCartin (2006) described the evolution of the tactic using LeRoy’s enumeration of casesxlviii:

    LeRoy found forty-four cases involving permanent replacements decided under the National Labor Relations Act or the Railway Labor Act in the 1950s. This amounted to only one documented use of permanent replacements per 80 major work stoppages during that decade. In the 1960s, the rate was one per 83 major work stoppages. In the 1970s, a slight increase in employers’ tendency to use permanent replacements was detectable, as the rate rose to one per 66 major work stoppages. LeRoy argues that this shift began around 1975. But it was in the aftermath of the PATCO strike that employers aggressively seized upon the striker replacement tactic. In the first ten years after 1981, employers used permanent replacements in roughly one out of seven major work stoppages. A sea change had clearly occurred in employers’ willingness to replace strikers.

    The regular threat and use of permanent replacements dramatically undermined workers’ legal right to strike and gave employers a powerful economic weapon to undermine and defeat unions. As Logan (2008) explained:

    [The use of striker replacements] has allowed hostile firms to defeat numerous strikes, undermined unions during contract negotiations, provided powerful antiunion propaganda during organizing campaigns, and enabled firms to instigate strikes, then recruit permanent replacements as a means of unloading unwanted unions.

    Legislation to curtail the practice of permanent replacements enjoyed the support of a majority of the House and the Senate, but failed because of numerous Republican filibusters, encouraged by the business community, in 1992 and 1994 (Logan 2008). Efforts to restrict the practice of permanent replacements through executive action in 1995 were struck down by the courts.xlix

    Allowing employer lockouts. At the same time Congress and the courts were weakening workers’ leverage, the NLRB and the courts gave employers additional leverage by allowing them to proactively lock out (layoff) their employees, the equivalent of the employer going on strike. Prior to 1964, employers were permitted to proactively lock out employees (called an offensive lockout) in two narrow circumstances: (1) where the employer was part of multiemployer bargaining and the union was striking one employer in an effort to force other employers into agreeing with the union’s demands, a practice known as whipsawing, and (2) in situations where the employer reasonably believed a strike was imminent. But in a 1965 decision in American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB,l the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that employers could proactively lock out their employees once an impasse had been reached in bargaining “for the sole purpose of applying economic pressure in support of [the employer’s] legitimate bargaining position.” In other words, the employer did not need to show that it was at risk of being whipsawed in a multiemployer arrangement, or that a strike was imminent—an employer could proactively lock out its employees simply to create leverage in support of its bargaining demands. American Ship dramatically shifted bargaining power to employers and, not surprisingly, afterwards employers increasingly engaged in proactive lockouts to achieve their bargaining goals.

    Lockouts became more prominent as strikes and union membership diminished. Though there are no data on lockouts for the period before 1990, two independent analyses show their increased importance. Marvit (2016), who employed various sources to track lockouts and strikes between 1990 and 2015, found that, though lockouts declined over the period, from 32 in 1990 to 13 in 2015, the decline in strikes was greater. As a result: “In 1990, lockouts represented less than 4% of total work stoppages, whereas in 2015 lockouts represented over 10% of total work stoppages.”

    The Bureau of National Affairs has also documented lockouts and strikes since 1990.li In 2012 it found: “The huge plunge in union membership over the past two decades has meant a huge plunge in union-initiated strikes. Yet it hasn’t meant a huge plunge in employer-initiated lockouts” (Coombs 2012a). It calculated that there had been 221 lockouts per 5,431 stoppages in 1990–1999 (4.07%), 164 lockouts per 2,995 stoppages in 2000–2009 (5.48%), and 31 lockouts per 312 stoppages in 2010–2011 (9.64%).

    It should be noted that the threat of a lockout, as with a threat of a strike, can have a substantial impact on bargaining outcomes.

    The rise in the proportion of lockouts to strikes changed in recent years due to a wave of strikes in 2018 and 2019 (a trend that is likely to hold in 2020 as well). There were more than 150 strikes in each of those two years, while lockouts remained at similar levels as in the 2012–2014 period, around 10 each year.lii

    Diminishing the duty to bargain in good faith. We’ve seen that by the 1970s there was growing awareness among employers that the NLRA lacked teeth, and a realization that, even if employers were found to have committed illegal, unfair labor practices, the remedies were weak and ineffective. Employers made use of these weaknesses to strip workers of bargaining power. Consider employers’ failure to bargain in good faith. In 1970, the Supreme Court ruled in H.K. Porter v. NLRB that the NLRB could not require any particular terms in a collective bargaining agreement and could only require that parties go back to the bargaining table—even though the parties in this case had been bargaining for eight years. The decision stripped the NLRB of a potent tool for getting employers and unions to bargain and reach agreement.liii Moreover, in earlier decades, the NLRB had ordered employers who had made frivolous objections to union certification and had failed to bargain in good faith to compensate workers for the wages and benefits they lost because of the bad-faith bargaining. But in 1970, the NLRB changed course and decided it lacked authority to order these remedies, on grounds that such remedies constituted “punishment” that is not authorized by the NLRA.liv With the absence of a meaningful remedy, the legal duty of employers to bargain in good faith with their workers’ union was severely undermined. Employers use this freedom to great advantage when dealing with newly formed unions. As noted above, workers at approximately half of all newly organized shops fail to reach an initial collective bargaining agreement with their employer (Fisk and Pulver 2009). Employers can string out the bargaining process and avoid reaching an agreement, creating a feeling of futility among workers who have recently chosen to organize.

    Allowing employers to use the bankruptcy process to gut collective bargaining agreements. Another trend that emerged in the 1970s and undermined unions and bargaining was the practice of employers using the bankruptcy system to shed their wage-and-benefit obligations under collective bargaining agreements. Corporations seized on court decisions finding collective bargaining agreements to be “executory” contracts, meaning contracts that had not yet been fully executed, and they sought and received permission from bankruptcy courts to shed these executory obligations. The U.S. Supreme Court exacerbated the problem in its 1984 decision in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,lv in which the court affirmed the ability of employers to shed their contractual obligations under collective bargaining agreements. Bildisco & Bildisco had reneged on wage increases and health and welfare contributions that were due to workers under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement that the company had negotiated with the Teamsters. According to news reports, at the time the decision was pending 22 corporations, including major corporations like Continental Airlines and Wilson Foods, had attempted to avoid their collective bargaining agreements through bankruptcy, and 19 had succeeded (Townsend 1984).

    Bildisco prompted a huge outcry, and Congress quickly responded by passing legislation to restrict the ability of employers to shed their collective bargaining responsibilities in bankruptcy, but the bankruptcy code still contains provisions allowing employers to void collective bargaining agreements where they make a sufficient showing of need (Sousa 2003).

    Ceccotti (2007) notes that in the early 2000s there was a “wave of bankruptcy cases targeting significant reductions in labor costs, pension funding, and retiree health obligations that has surged through the airline industry, the steel industry, auto supply, and other heavily unionized industries in recent years….[D]ebtors have been able to extract substantial labor and benefit costs cuts, either through, or under the threat of, court-ordered relief under sections 1113 and 1114. Many have involved the termination of defined benefit pension plans as well.” Ceccotti notes that in these “transforming business restructurings,” “bankruptcy has once again become a deliberate strategy used to broadly target costs associated with collective bargaining agreements and collectively-bargained pension and retiree health obligations.”

    One union president testified in 2013 that bankruptcy proceedings meant a “debtor (company) essentially had a gun to labor’s head—it was a take it or leave it proposition, not a negotiation.”lvi

    Automation and globalization are a minor part of the overall picture

    The contribution of automation and globalization to the decline of unions is prominent in most discussions, and the view draws on some commonly known facts. First, the rapid decline in union membership in manufacturing occurred at the same time as imports escalated and attention to competitive pressures from foreign producers, increasingly those from low-wage nations, became a prominent concern. Second, because automation has been faster in manufacturing than in other sectors of the economy, the manufacturing share of total employment has been declining. Given that manufacturing was a highly unionized sector, this development mechanically led to an eroded union share. That union erosion has also happened in other advanced nations supports an intuition that trends happening across nations, such as automation and globalization, are the true underlying factors.

    In this light, any impact that eroded unionization is having on wage inequality or labor’s share of income, the argument goes, is just a reflection of globalization and automation. In economics discussions this means that union decline is a symptom, not a cause, of wage inequality, with globalization and automation the real culprits behind both wage inequality and deunionization.

    This section examines the role of globalization and automation primarily by examining the role of manufacturing decline on unionization trends. The analysis does not examine the impacts of globalization on unions in sectors other than manufacturing because these impacts, like the outsourcing of call centers and white-collar work, primarily developed in the 1990s and later years and not in the turning-point decades for private-sector unionization of the 1970s and 1980s.

    Trends in manufacturing versus nonmanufacturing sectors, 1977–2019

    Figure G shows union coverage in the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing segments of the nonagricultural private sector in the United States (all references to the private sector hereafter are to the nonagricultural private sector) from 1977 to 2019.lvii “Union coverage” reflects those who are members of the union as well as those who aren’t members but are covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Note that although union coverage in manufacturing started at a higher level and fell more sharply than in the rest of the private sector, the decline was far from unique. Union coverage in nonmanufacturing fell from 17.6% in 1977 to just 6.8% in 2019, a 60% contraction. The manufacturing union coverage contraction was 74%.

    Figure G

    Trends in private-sector union coverage rates in manufacturing and (nonagricultural) nonmanufacturing, 1977–2019

    ManufacturingNonagriculture, nonmanufacturing
    197737.6%17.6%
    197836.7%16.9%
    197938.2%17.2%
    198034.8%16.7%
    198133.8%15.4%
    198232.2%14.9%
    198330.5%14.5%
    198428.4%13.2%
    198526.9%12.3%
    198625.8%11.8%
    198724.7%11.3%
    198823.8%11.0%
    198923.1%10.6%
    199022.2%10.6%
    199121.8%10.4%
    199221.0%10.2%
    199320.3%10.0%
    199419.6%9.9%
    199518.7%9.4%
    199618.3%9.2%
    199717.2%9.1%
    199816.8%8.8%
    199916.6%8.8%
    200015.6%8.6%
    200115.5%8.6%
    200215.1%8.3%
    200314.3%8.1%
    200413.9%7.8%
    200513.7%7.6%
    200612.5%7.4%
    200712.0%7.6%
    200812.3%7.8%
    200911.9%7.4%
    201011.6%7.1%
    201111.2%7.1%
    201210.5%6.9%
    201311.0%7.0%
    201410.5%7.0%
    201510.0%7.1%
    20169.6%7.0%
    201710.0%6.9%
    20189.7%6.8%
    20199.4%6.8%
    ChartData Download data

    The data below can be saved or copied directly into Excel.

    The data underlying the figure.

    Sources: For the years 1973–1981 the May Current Population Survey (CPS); for the years 1983-2019 the CPS Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) earnings files. Unionstats.com, Hirsh and Macpherson 2020.

    The data underlying Figure G allow us a first pass at assessing the role of manufacturing’s decline on union coverage. A simple shift-share analysis indicates that the erosion of the manufacturing share of employment from 1979 to 2019, a decline from 30.2% to 12.6%, is responsible for a decline of private-sector union coverage of 3.3 percentage points, or about a fifth of the overall 15.8 percentage point decline in the private nonagricultural sector.lviii This erosion of manufacturing employment presumably captures the impact of greater imports (and trade deficits in “goods”) and provides our first assessment of their impact: not trivial but not dominant. We will explore more rigorous assessments below that all find an even smaller impact of manufacturing’s erosion on union decline.

    Union coverage erosion in major sectors and specific industries

    We can obtain a clearer picture of globalization’s impact by examining the erosion of union coverage in specific broad sectors and in more detailed industries. Table 5 presents trends in selected major private-sector industries where the data are comparable for 1979, 1983, and 2019 (this methodology leaves out much of private-sector personal and business services).lix Adding the data for 1979 highlights the very sharp drop in union coverage emerging from an assault on unions amidst the deep recession and a sharp rise in imports in the early 1980s.

    Table 5

    Union coverage in selected sectors: 1979, 1983, and 2019

    Union coverage (%)Change (%)
    1979*198320191979–20191983–2019
    Mining37.223.14.6-32.6-18.5
    Construction3530.414.5-20.5-15.9
    Nondurable goods manufacturing32.528.49.7-22.8-18.7
    Durable good manufacturing39.832.19.2-30.6-22.9
    Utilities46.743.725.1-21.6-18.6
    Wholesale12.710.95-7.7-5.9
    Retail trade10.99.74.7-6.2-5
    Transportation/warehousing5253.624.1-27.9-29.5
    Communications54.651.713-41.6-38.7

    * Data for 1979 are pooled May Current Population Survey data for 1978–1980.

    Source: Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group data.

    Several nonmanufacturing sectors that had substantial union coverage rates in 1979, many comparable to or greater than manufacturing, suffered a larger or nearly comparable erosion of union coverage than manufacturing: They include mining, construction, communications, transportation/warehousing, and utilities. Other sectors such as wholesale trade and retail trade lost more than half their union coverage. Overall, union erosion was pervasive in sectors that had substantial union coverage, beyond just manufacturing, and every one of these sectors lost a large share of its union coverage.

    Table 6 adds detail to the analysis by examining union coverage decline in 19 specific detailed industries over the 1979–2019 period.lx There were substantial declines in union coverage in a wide array of specific industries beyond manufacturing: mining, both metal and coal; fishing and hunting; transportation such as air, trucking, buses, and rail; hotels; grocery stores; hospitals; radio and television broadcasting; warehousing; newspapers; and electric power.

    Table 6

    Changes in union coverage, selected detailed industries, 1979–2019

    Union coverageChange
    Detailed industry1979*198320191979-20191983-2019
    Fishing, hunting, and trappingn.a.17.88.0n.a.-9.8%
    Metal ore mining59.642.23.2-56.4%-39.0%
    Coal mining67.862.89.6-58.2%-53.2%
    Nonmetallic mineral and not specified mining, and quarrying46.634.814.2-32.4%-20.6%
    Newspaper publishers24.821.46.6-18.2%-14.8%
    Air transportation47.545.739.4-8.1%-6.3%
    Rail transportation83.685.460.9-22.7%-24.5%
    Truck transportation48.639.68.8-39.8%-30.8%
    Bus service and urban transit49.852.338.7-11.1%-13.6%
    Warehousing and storage26.228.15.7-20.5%-22.4%
    Radio and television broadcasting and cable19.717.412.1-7.6%-5.3%
    Electric power generation, transmission, and distribution51.847.827.2-24.6%-20.6%
    Hardware stores6.34.31.3-5.0%-3.0%
    Grocery stores38.233.515.1-23.1%-18.4%
    Vending machine operators16.418.64.1-12.3%-14.5%
    Hotels (Traveler accommodation)18.315.47.4-10.9%-8.0%
    Services to buildings and dwellings24.615.65.9-18.7%-9.7%
    Barber shopsn.a.10.73.2n.a.-7.5%
    Hospitals21.022.615.1-5.9%-7.5%

    * Data for 1979 are pooled May Current Population Survey (CPS) data for 1978-1980.

    Source: CPS Outgoing Rotation Group data.

    Rosenfeld (2020) and Denice and Rosenfeld (2018) make a similar point by examining union decline in major blue-collar occupations. Rosenfeld compared union decline from 1973 to 2016 in two occupations greatly affected by automation and/or globalization—production and mining— and in two occupations that “either cannot be outsourced or haven’t yet borne the brunt of technological changes”—transportation and construction. Rosenfeld notes that union erosion was widespread in these occupations, with the decline in unionization within transportation and construction occupations falling from 50% in 1973 to less than 20% in 2016.

    Statistically assessing the impact of the change in the industrial distribution of employment

    It is possible to obtain more exacting analyses of the impact of shifting industrial employment patterns on union coverage trends by employing regression analyses.lxi The starting point is regression analysis explaining union coverage (members plus those covered by a union contract as the dependent variable) that considers many factors including and beyond a worker’s industry.lxii The goal is to assess the impact of the change in the industrial distribution of employment (primarily the shift from manufacturing to the service sector) on the 15.8 percentage point fall (from 22.8% to 7.0%) in private-sector union coverage between 1979 and 2019.lxiii We do this in two ways.

    The first methodlxiv decomposes, or breaks down, the changes in union coverage into the role of the changes over time in (1) the “composition” of the workforce—its industrial distribution and its demographic and other characteristics—and (2) the separate effect that each of these characteristics of the workforce has on workers’ likelihood of being in a union.lxv If workers in a particular state are less likely to be in a union, for example, how much of the decline in unionization is due to the fact that there are more workers in that state now than was the case in 1979 (a composition effect) and how much is due to a change in the likelihood that workers in that state will be in a union today than in 1979?lxvi This exercise reveals that the changes in industry employment composition explain 2.5 percentage points of the overall 15.8 percentage point decline in union coverage from 1979 to 2019, or about 16% of the total change. The advantage of this computation is that it examines the impact of the changes in the industrial composition of employment while controlling for changes in the distribution of workers across states and occupations and across various demographic characteristics including gender, race/ethnicity, education, and age.

    The second method uses the regressions for each year, 1979 and 2019, to simulate the level of union coverage that would have obtained if the industry structure were swapped between years.lxvii We present the results in Table 7. In 1979, 22.8% of private-sector workers were covered by a union. Our simulation finds that if in 1979 the economy had instead the same industrial structure as in 2019, but all other features of the 1979 economy were held constant, then union coverage would have been 20.3%. This exercise suggests that the changed pattern of sectoral employment lowered union coverage by only 2.5 percentage points. We get similar results when we do the simulation the other way around. In 2019 private-sector union coverage was 7.0%, but it would have been 7.4% had the sectoral composition in 2019 been identical to what it had been in 1979, suggesting that sectoral employment patterns only reduced union coverage by about 0.5 percentage points. The usual interpretation of these results is to bracket the actual impact as somewhere between these two estimates. In this case, the data suggest that the shift out of manufacturing employment has had an impact that accounts for less than a fifth of the overall decline of private-sector union coverage between 1979 and 2019.

    Table 7

    Impact of change in industry composition: Counterfactuals in 1979 and 2019

    1979*2019
    ActualWith 2019 industry distributionActualWith 1979 industry distribution
    Private-sector union coverage22.8%20.3%7.0%7.4%
    Impact of industry composition changes-2.52%0.46%
    Regression decomposition
    Impact of industry composition2.5%

    * Data for 1979 are pooled May Current Population Survey data for 1978–1980. Difference between 1979 and 2019 means evaluated at 1979 'betas' for industry.

    Source: Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group data.

    Union decline as an independent, not dependent, factor

    The claim that automation and globalization have driven the erosion of unions means that automation and globalization, not unionism itself or collective bargaining, are what is responsible for the wage stagnation or wage inequality that have flowed from union erosion. In statistical terms, these claims are saying that union decline is not the true factor (independent of other factors) but rather is itself determined by other factors. Because we do not have blind trial experiments or even natural experiments focused on union decline, there is no dispositive evidence upon which to draw. The evidence presented here so far has focused on data indicating that union decline goes much beyond what has occurred in the sector most impacted by globalization, manufacturing.

    More can be learned from some of the analyses of the union impact on wages. For instance, Denice and Rosenfeld (2018) quantify the impact of union erosion on the wage levels of nonunion workers. They find:

    The size of the union effect is substantial, especially for men. We estimate that weekly wages would be approximately $61—or 6 percent—higher for nonunion private sector men if private sector union densities were as high in 2015 as they were in 1977. Over the course of a year, this would result in a wage gain of $3,172. Among women, the counterfactual predictions reveal that a nonunion worker would earn $18 more weekly had unions not declined since 1977, or $936 annually.

    It is useful that Denice and Rosenfeld are examining the decline of unions within occupations as opposed to industries and that they directly control for the risks of automation (“the average routine task content of each occupation to control for that occupation’s risk of automation”) and manufacturing decline (the proportion of each occupation’s employment in manufacturing). They report that their results “are robust to the inclusion of controls for the risk of automation, offshoring.” This leads them to claim that their estimates reflect the “independent influence of private-sector union strength on nonunion private-sector pay.” For our purposes it is important to note that including measures of offshoring and automation risk does not diminish the estimated union impact on nonunion wages.

    Newly developed union membership data back to the passage of the NLRA in the 1930s allow Farber et al. (2018) to examine whether the patterns of union rise and decline correspond to the expected patterns if changes in union density simply reflected automation. They do so in response to a set of papers (most prominently Acemoglu et al. 2001) that “argue that any empirical relationship between unions and inequality is spurious, driven by variation of an omitted variable [skill-biased-technological change, i.e., automation] that simultaneously reduces union density and increases inequality.”lxviii Automation, according to Acemoglu et al., is expected to erode “union density because as automation increases unskilled unionized workers become relatively more expensive to employ [i.e., priced out of market] and unions have, by construction, no option to organize the more skilled workers.” Farber et al. note that data from a point in time (i.e., a cross-section analysis of one year’s survey) do not allow a test of the claim that automation is the true driver of union decline, but that the new historical time series on union membership, tracking eras of both union expansion and union contraction, is well suited to examining the co-movement of union density, skill composition, and union premiums predicted by those claiming that automation is the true factor underlying union decline. Farber et al. conclude that “our data reject many of these predictions, suggesting that union density is not merely an artifact of skill-biased technological change,” i.e., automation.

    Last, Ahlquist and Downey (2019) directly examine the impact of imports on unionization in manufacturing and overall, building on the influential work of Autor et al. (2013) examining the impact of Chinese imports on wages and employment (they also build on Pierce and Schott 2016).lxix

    Ahlquist and Downey note that there has been “a substantial academic literature investigating the link between globalization and deunionization, with a particular focus on trade-related ‘deindustrialization’ and its effects on the relatively unionized manufacturing sector.” They conclude that, “This early literature generally found weak or inconsistent effects of trade on union density.”

    Based on their own analysis, Ahlquist and Downey conclude:

    Источник: https://www.epi.org/unequalpower/publications/private-sector-unions-corporate-legal-erosion/
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    India achieves the grand feat of administering 1 crore vaccine doses in a single day.

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    Keegan Evans, 25, is a co-owner of Wake Up Waffles; an online company that produces and sells high protein, gluten free waffle/pancake/baking mixes. Blending his passions for photography and fitness, Keegan embarked on the waffle journey with his fiancée/business partner Nicole in December 2016. They plan to expand their product lines and enter the retail market very soon. Keegan also co-owns Parker Lane Productions with his brother Colin where they produce Instagram content budget busters whos breaking the bank lesson 9 answer sheet a number of food companies.

     

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    Nicole Bergmann, 23, is a co-owner of Wake Up Waffles; an online company that produces high protein, gluten free pancake/waffle/baking mixes. Starting early on with a health and fitness-focused lifestyle she found the entrepreneurial bug and created the company with her fiancé Keegan Evans in December of 2016. With a successful 2 years and the ongoing ambition to build the company to its fullest, Nicole and Keegan plan on expanding in the near future.

     

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    Kevin Webb

    He discovered his passion for health and fitness while playing various sports, mostly at Susquehanna-Valley High School. He graduated from SUNY Broome with a degree in Business, then attended the American Academy of Personal Training in Boston. He started his Personal Training business in the fall of 2012, and opened his first location of KW Fitness in Vestal in March of 2014. In October 2017, KW Fitness opened it’s 2nd location in Fayetteville, NY. KW Fitness prides check amazon gift card balance uk on being the Premier Lifestyle Coaching Center for men and women who are frustrated with how far they have let themselves go. Unlike other gyms that pack classes and are lacking in support and accountability with programs that fail to deliver, KW Fitness ends the frustration by helping each client improve their quality of life through safe, effective personal training and nutrition programs that are customized to each individual, with guaranteed results.

     

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    budget busters whos breaking the bank lesson 9 answer sheet Francisco Chronicle
    Jessica Didia (left) sits in her mom Laurie Steves’s car as <i>budget busters whos breaking the bank lesson 9 answer sheet</i> smokes a mixture of crack and fentanyl together on Wednesday, June 9, 2021 in San Francisco, California. This was the second time they had seen one another in nearly 10 years. Laurie’s son Zachary died last December of a drug overdose and her daughter Jessica has been homeless and addicted to drugs in San Francisco for a decade. The death of her son propelled her to try and save her daughter. Laurie packed up her apartment in Port Orchard, Washington and moved to San Francisco with the idea that budget busters whos breaking the bank lesson 9 answer sheet would stay there for “as long as it takes” to help Jessica.
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